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Tha purpose of this study was to trees the steps which
led to the consolidationof'the Union Pacific end Kansas Pa
cific Railroads in 1880.

Thismerger wee a natural one*

uniting two Pacific roads created by the Union Pacific Enabling Act of 1862, but the methods used in bringing It'about
were not "natural,''

in -order to understand hew this was1

accomplished some consideration had to be given to the busi
ness ethics of that period and the circumstances which moti
vated Jay Gould, 'the prime mover behind the consolidation.
Material used in the preparation of this study was
secured from two main sources, the Report of the ...United
MlSaa gas&IM MUttft*
Dodge Papers*

and the Grenville Mellon

The nine-voluae Report was found in the Business

and Industrial Department of the Omaha Public Library,
Dodge Papers ware found in two locations*

The

The entire collec

tion (468 Boxed volumes) axe under the caxe of 'the lews State
Historical and Art Museum* -Sea- Moines, lows.

Extracts' and

typed copies of many pertinent papers from- the- Dodge- collection
are to be found In the Council Bluffs,-Iowa, Public Library*
When a person starts * research project he features a
block of time in which he must shut himself off from outside

civilisation, enter dark and lonely catacombs, and in all
probability say good-bye to' people*

The-research-for this

V
thesis has taken the author a good deal of time, but the
*
i
time end- effort has brought quite a few'new acquaintances—
ail of whom helped make what might have.been- a dreary job
much more enjoyable.

My deepest appreciation to these people,

whose helpfulness and cooperation made this project a reality*
To these friends and near-friends 1 respectfully dedicate this
work*
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CHAPTER S
TH8 FIRST TRAKSeONTINtKTAL * THE UNION PACIFIC
The id** etl « transcontinental railroad fascinated the
minds of Americans From th* time of the introduction of the
steam locomotive into the United States. ' There was talk of
connecting the Soot end loot Coasts as early ae the 1830’s but

the development of railroading had -net reached a point where
-this was practical.
tical standpoint,

Nor wee such an idea feasible from a poll*
the Treaty of Guadelupe-Hidaigo signed in

1§4S*. finally connected the western edge of the Louisiana Pur
chase to the California coast end gave the United States owner
ship of the m m between.

The land for the transcontinental was

in hand} needed was a concrete plan for effecting a railroad
across it*
One such plan had been put forth by Asa Whitney, New York

£

merchant end world traveler, in 1845.

Whitney had the notion

that a railroad should be built through the South Pass (in Wyo
ming) to the Pacific Ocean with what he called "private capital**

Robert S. fo§el* The Union
t e f lOlfimiM. vBaltimorei
.960), p . IB {Hubert ft.Russel, J
freed

Whitney would have bad the federal government, in order to
maintain "'the principle of private enterprise and privet# r e 
sponsibility,” sell to him eighty million acres of government
lend for a price of eight million dollars or ten cents an acre.

2

The Whitney method of financing the road would have"

been based upon the enhancement of -the vein#' of .the lend as e
result of idie railroad end selling it t» private individuals.
Whitney should have libelled it a ".wired enterprise* as later
;
3
interpreters* with hind-sight, so aptly did*
It ls.#l*e ap*

parent today that the Whitney plan would .not have worked as h*
envisioned ft because the price of land would net have .increased
until after the railroad was completed* while the actual need
for money was during the construction.

Public reaction to the

plan did not operate in Its favor} it was considered too pri
vate, a swindle benefitting one man# although this did not'

deter Whitney. A contemporary description held it to be a
"wholesale stock-jobbing scheme foisted upon the public domain."
Another plan, tbit can be described as "quaai-govexnaiantal* in scope flowed from the pen of William M. Gwin, 'Senator
from California, in 18S3.

the Gwin plan was fundamentally a

WipreMcmiLtCttt-OTr,
. <c*»

Fogsl, pa. clt.. p. 28*
IfeM** P. 29.
Quoted in ibid.. p. 29.

land grant philosophy, of the type inaugurated by Stephan A.
Douglas for the Illinois Central Railroad in 1850,

Gwtn origi

nally proposed * grant of forty sections of loud for each mile

of track laid.

Four-fifths of the land Die to be given to the

railroad after completion of each 100 mile section of track—

the other one-fifth open completion of the entire road. The
President of the United States would select the route and con
struction would be supervised'by « commission reporting to the
Secretary of »ar.

the company was to reap the benefits fee

thirty years whereupon ownership of the raid would revert to

the government of the United States.

During the .period of pri

vate operation the federal Government could use the railroad

free of charge, with Congress setting the rate* for ell other
business.

Had the 6wln plan been adopted and the land sold for

an average of only *1.25 per acre, it would have, yielded’the
builders *27/700 per mile or *7,700 above the estimated coat of
construction par mile.

b

the Gwin plan seemed to strike the fancy of all concerned*
from its Introduction in 1853 down to 1860 the leading transcon
tinental railroad bills wore merely variations upon this theme*
Some changed the sic# of the land grant# length of private cp-

4
oration, ox added varying amounts of monetary asalstanco, but
basically oil were the same aa the one pot femtsd by the Sens6
to* from California,
The Congress heard many arguments to explain why a txan*continental railroad was necessary, but all could be categorixed under three major titles, those of political, economic,
and military.

The military reasons given ware associated with

the bringing ef California closer to the rest of the nation of
that time.

This, was especially strong when the thxaftt of possi

ble British ox Russian Invasion of California not bandied about,
Oregon was mentioned in the same vain*

The strategic value of

having a railroad connecting these two American outposts to the'
rest of the nation would have been extremely important in event
of wax*

A railroad as a solution to the Plains Indian problem
T
did not come into consideration until the Civil Wax*
"the political reasons were not <plf# as simple, being
bound up as they were in the sectional differences prevalent
during the fifties.

Southerners saw a Pacific reed as a means

of improving the waning strength of the South,

Northerners

envisaged the prospective railroad as an extension of the' al
ready dominant rail network of the Qhio-Miaeiseippl valley,

Fogel, jg* £ii,, p. 35*
IMA** P» 20.

unlike the Southerner though, the North was split Into cliques
seeking an eastern terminus for the transcontinental far then*
8
selves*
The commercial or'economic considerations were net com
plex at all* They consisted ef two parts* One, a method ef
draining off the excess dregs of Society and'putting these
unfortunate into a frontier environment where they would he
forced to work in eider to exlstj no explanation was given as
to hew they would he convinced to go.

ted two* a method of

creating'markets, sources of raw materials, ted providing an*.
couragement for a-alowly increasing industrial machine.

9

As the final show dote approached, the "issue before
Congress was never really one of choosing between opposites**
10
a government road or a. private enterprise** All interests in
volved, both North and South, were either pushing for a govern*
ment built and supported road, or * privately built end gav*
ernment subsidized road*

A pragmatic attitude seemed to have

become dominant--with the objective that of getting a trans
continental railroad- under construction by any acceptable
method*

Further proof of this is seen In the -additional in

ducements legislated -even after the road had commenced its

sane three arguments can be seen to
Cong., 2nd Sess.»Vol. 32,pp.2675-8.
** p. <27,

6
alothlike movement West* ' Sooiuft# of the lack of settlement
between th# Missouri Hive* and the PacificCoast, with the ex
ception of the Mormon area around the Great Salt hake* the
pushing lot a transcontinental at this time his been called ft
It
"premature enterprise."
“Premature'*, according to one author
ity, "that is, when the measuring rod of lie maturity and
practicality was the willingness of unaided private enterprise,

guided solely by th# search for profits, to undertake the pro13
loot**

The railroad was "premature" when first suggested and,

using th# above definition, premature when it was eventually
constructed lit 1863-1869. Such ait idea la not ft recent inno
vations Charles Francis Adams, Jr., was guilty of making a
similar remark in 187##. lust one year after the completion of

the Union Pacific.

Me felt that there was no urgent need for

'the Union Pacific at that time because the entire policy of
building the Union Pacific was "based on th# stimulation of

ft

14
supply in excess of the natural demand.“

Adams blamed the

"clamor for it" end. for th# s««d even becoming # reality at
the time it did# upon public opinion,

12
^

A Sidelight on Adams end

]*# pp. 99*44*
I* »

r *

18
14
Charles F. Adams, Jr., "Railway Problems in.1869,"
Nortfr American Review. CX (January, 1870), p* 116.

bis/statement is that just fourteen years later {1384) 'he was
to become president of the Union Pacific, after the road had
reached adolescence.
The Republican Party platform of I860, as had the other
13
three party platforms, celled 'for a transcontinental railroad*'
Attempts were made during 1861* to fiat a hill through* but the
setting up of war- machinery proved Of primary Importance.

All '

of the arguments used dawn through the years Were brought into
play during the 1862 pre-election session of Congress with re
newed vigor*

Secession gave the North an opportunity to push

through a bill that was. favorable,' A "binding up the Union®
theme played a prominent part in. the hearings.

Detractors

■had maintained that within twenty years private capital- would
build such a road without any assistance.

Despite the threat

of government intervention and- implied destruction of the pri
vate enterprise system, Congress and. the general public were
unwilling to wait one Congressional session, let alone twenty
16
years,
The bill that eventually became the Union Pacific En
abling Act of 1362 m u e*id to have been written in Its origi
nal form by Henry Bennett of Elmira* New York, who was then
chief lobbyist.of the Leavenworth, -Pawnee and Hastern Railroad
"1
',
'William PxanfcEornew, KaaSMS A Histgp &ljb& ifyMwE
{Norman, Oklahoma* University of Oklahoma Press, 19571,
Ml
pi I3|g

(of Kansas).

Bennett cane to Washington in late 1861 armed

not only with the bill, but twenty thousand shoves of LP&W
stock (pair value one million dollies) to dispense for favors,

18

loti* on other individuals who became associated with the Union
Pacific w«v» also accused of having spent $167,000 for "spe
cial legal expense* during consideration of the 1862 bill.
A point of information vital to the understanding of a discussion of the 1862 Enabling Act is that there wave several rail*

road companies already enjoying corporate life .that were avidly
interested in becoming a part of or the transcontinenta1 rail*

road.

The Union Pacific was not ope of these— it received its

life from the 1862 Enabling Act itself. The M i l attempted to
create a transcontinental system of railroads rather than
single road across the continent.

The and result, it must be

admitted# was a single line# but this was net the original in
tent.

The eat provided for a beard of commissioners to estab
lish a “Union pacific feallroad Company* with directions aa to

Hereafter referred to #e the LP&»«
18
U. S. Cong..Senate,
IMlnn, 50th Cana.. 1st Session^Senate Baaa* Oocument No
1887, Testimony of Jamas C. 'liettO, Pol.111, p. 1681. Thi
document hereafter referred to aa Pac.By.Comm.Report.
4i. 45th Cong., 2nd Seas., Vol. VII

pax value a# stack, officers and a board of directore, and the
20
mount of stock to be sold to an individual.
The other parti
cipating roads wore to join the Unto** Pacific at the 186th

21
meridian ox along the Union Pacific route m o t of that point.
the other roods and their route* More no foiloust
1.

SB

Pacific Railroad of Missouri (later th# Missouri

Pacific) was to build west from Kansas City, Missouri, across
th# Kansas and Nebraska prairie to join th# Union Pacific at
the 100th Meridian in Nebraska’s Platte Valley.
2.

LP&W was to build from Leavenworth, Kansas, and eon*

nect with the Pacific Railroad of Missouri.
3.

Hannibal and at, Joseph Railroad (of Missouri) was

to build west from St. Joseph, Missouri, and meet th# Union
Pacific at th# 100th Meridian or connect with the Iowa branch
of that toad coming from Omaha* so long as the Hannibal did
not exceed 166- miles in length.
4.

Sioux City Pacific Railroad was to be constructed

by the Union Pacific: from Sioux City, Iowa, to the Iowa Branch
of the Union Pacific at ox east of the 166th Meridian.
5.

Appendix
e

Central Pacific Railroad was the Western half of the

— „
--- 1*.37th dona,, 2nd ##**,, ,
___
"»w o? theT3nited States", Chap.cxx, p. 382. Hereid to as Ret of 1862.

lo
transcontinental toed,

It was to bo constructed by a group

of Californians from, eventually* ion Francisco to the Calif
ornia -Nevada border.
The Union Pacific Railroad, Iowa branch# was to extend
from a point across the Missouri River at Council bluffs# Iowa,
up the Platte Valley in Nebraska Territory to the 100th meri23
dian*
Fro® the 100th Meridian to the Californla-Nevada
Border all the participating reads that had reached that point
ware to build the line connecting with the Central Pacific, .or.
if lust one of the lines survived it could build on west*
The Act also provided a Means end a reason for build
ing these roads with a series of lend grants and bond subsi
dies.

A direct grant'of five alternate sections of public

land per mile of track constructed was to be selected from
within a ten Mile distance of each side of the two hundred
24
foot wide right-of-way.
The all# of the land grant was later
25
(1864) doubled and the right-of-way width halved*

The bond subsidy provided* in 1862, a scaled amount,
depending upon the difficulty of construction.

m

The prairie

low-land subsidy was sixteen thousand' dollars per mile, in

Ibid.. p., 281.
24
I M d .. p. 382.
25
Sonqres'sfonaR Gl'ohe?. 38th Cong., 1st Seas,,. Vol. 34,
Appendix "laws of the Whited States", Chap* CCXfl, p, 250*
Hereafter referred to as Act of 1864*

n
the region between th# mountains (Rockies and fierra Nevadas)
thirty-two thousand dollars per mile, and in th# mountains
the payments were *'trebled“or forty-eight thousand dollars
26
per mile.of completed tract*
In 1864 this wee further liberal
ized by transforming the government subsidy bends into a .'Se
cond mortgage and allowing the railroad companies to issue
first mortgage bonds In an amount equal to the government sub2T
sidy per mile, although the company could not issue its first
mortgage bends until after the issuance of the government sub-,
sidy bonds* It In effect doubled theamount of money the
builders could ley their hands upon*

Thisgave them thirty-

two* sixty-four and ninety-air thousand dollars per mile res

pectively through- the various terrains*
fine# the 1862 Act did not attract enough investors it
wee necessary to modify the original act in 1864.

Another

reason for ex at least an influence upon this later act was
the Credit Mobilier of America - construction company extra
ordinary.
The origin of the Credit Mobilise was based upon a set of rather short sighted, but* for that day normal assumptions.
They weret
1.

All the money to be made out of the Union Pacific
t

JJPJTM i M
Ml M

1862.* p. 383.■■f’
1864. p. 261.

project would he mode ill flit construction of the read*
2. flit toad itself as a ^legitimate business enter*
prise* would never field a profit*
3. the government offered on immense bonus to- any set
ef men who built the toed# but only if these men else eon**-irolled the railroad company itself could they control the
construct!#!! contracts and that# in their profits*
4. the solution was to -put th# control of both com*
panics, railroad and construction ini# th# hand# of on# set
of men*

20

the failure of the Union Pacific to raise enough money to- do
its own construction'became apparent by early-1004.

forty

miles of line had been graded# but only-a-few miles of track
had been. laid.

It. wm at this juncture that thomes €*• Mutant*

then Vice,fresident of the Union Pacific was given-a free; hand.
©urant had started,Ms business-life #«..* member of an
uncle*#.flour and grain exporting business*

He moved from,

there-.into successful stock brokerage' and- finally; like many a
visionary promoter of the day into railroad construction and
Its attendant speculation* ■ Me. built, railroads in Michigan and
Iowa, and was on#:of th# prim# contractors-fof the Chicago and
Eo&fckXaland Hailroad* .throughout, the##-'.earlier dealing#'he

had been associated with, ox hid working for him, west of the
persons who were later to become famous financiers and builders
of th# Union Pacific.*
the alternative -that' Durant used* when it was decided
that the Union Pacific would not construct its wan road, was
the exhaustive contract construction company.

The creation

of such an organisation was neither new at.but of the ordi
nary} rather, it was common-plsce In railroad building 'during
30
the period between. 1855-1880.
The difference between the

Credit Mobilise and other railroad construction companies
seems to have been only in the amount of prefits it was able
to accrue.

The exhaustive contract system was used time and

again by other construction companies, bat to the Credit Mo
bilise befell the dubious honor ef being singled out as the

The honor did not fall upon undeserving

greatest malefactor.

shoulders,
'The amounts received in the form of bend subsidy, Union
Pacific bonds* and lends sold vary according to the criterion
used for estimation.

A l l e n

J o h n s - "

The estimates range from a low of forty-

M

W

D l l * * , CL li, 1 A n *

w
o p . c l t . .

B 4* + i n n n

)»

ai ijpfliiife

01* V., pp, 452-3.
D a v i s ,

(S di f n r n 1 .

p.

l i t .

eight, million to •.high ef seventy*four million dollars.
Profits are similarly difficult to determine as records were
inadequately kept.

The estimates varied from slightly over

eight million to a high of almost forty-four million dollars
(see Figure No..

l&J*

The very motive behind the building of a transcontinan*

tel railroad presented an evil.

Anytime speed of construction

is considered paramount over physical and geographic capabi
lities the resulting cost must he inherently higher#

Author

ities hive estimated that within twenty years after 1662,
private capital and enterprise would have been ready to build

{$j|

the read alone. ' Another estimate was that'If ten years would
have been used to build the road, instead of four, the overall

east could have been cut by one-half to two-thirds.

33

However critical a person might be of the Credit Mobilier and the people who surrounded it, one thing should be
kept in mind— it completed the railroad!

There was waste.

Fred A. Shannon,
ompany, inc.*
AmericaiGr
Senior

:el. ££.£ii., p.19s |ewie .Henry Haney. SflMmalgMl

r.vmvgmm*-

WXSCPftSJLfl

JMJMJjlg-Mfigft.

X9X®#i f 01 • XXg p*. Xlrll»

Fae.ftv.Comm.Report. Vol.Vlli, Testimony of G. M. bodge,
p. 3919.

FIGURE 1
ESTIMATES. FROM VARIOUS SOURCES, OF

m o m s SMS BUILDING the union PACIFIC
Da.M£luarMy.

iiw a t

1. Wilson Committee (House ef Representatives
Investigating Committee, 1873}, .......... $23,366,319.81*
2* Rowland Ha*ard. . ,. . ,, * * * , ,

*

, , 15,000,000.00**

3. 3. 3, Crawford. , ,, . . . . «
4, Henry Kirk White. .. « « *

, . . * .

,

8,141,903.70***

, •, 16,710,432.82+

3, John P» ©avis....... , ................

29,521,213.11++

6. George A. Donely.

13,712,368.00+++

.Rv .Comm .Repox t. p. 65.
loiand Retard. The Credit Mobiller ef America. (Providence*
Sidney S. Rider*-' 1881}, pp. 27-29. '
***J, 3, Crawford, The Credit Mobllier of America;, (Boston!
G. W. Calkins and Co., 1880}, pp. 71-72.
. +Henry Kirk White, MMyelery £g ,the Union Pacific Railway.
(Chicago* Chicago University Press,'1893},; pp. 35-37.
- ++John P. Davis. The Union Pacific Railway. (Chicano* S. C.
Griggs and Co., l i f d l ^ i T m i f S ,
'
+++George Anthony Donely, *Th« Construction of the Union '
Pacific Railway hf the Credit Mebilie* of America,0
(Unpublished Master*s essay, Columbia University, 1958),
pp. 78-79.

corruption, and m e m * profit, but th® objective was reached*
the result was a transcontinental railroad*

If* on the other

hand* one would look at it with hind-sight end point out the
ways In which money could have been saved, and only a fair
profit been allowed* these la an argument for detracting from
the credit heaped upon the builders,

There was a definite

need for such « railway and the expressions of the heat minds
of the time verify this*

Had the question been pvt off until

private enterprise had found it profitable to build* the whole
settlement end history of the West might conceivably have been
much different*
Ground was broken in early December of 1863, for the
beginning of the road at a point (near Ninth .end Capital
Streets} in Omaha, Nebraska Territory*

The Chief Engineer,

Peter bey* for the Union Pacific had platted the toed almost
directly west from that ideation* but other heads prevailed
-and the line «a. laid 'out and graded followed the Missouri
liver south a way* then slanted southwest through, the river
bluffs toward present day Fapllliea* Nebraska, up along the
Slkhorn River to Fremont, 'there Joining the Platte River valley,
and following it wait into Colorado to Julesburg.

®ey and an

assistant, Grenville Dodge, had surveyed and: sight located the
prospective route across Nebraska, beginning in 1853 at the
behest and pay of Henry Parnham and Thomas C. Durant* free
wheeling builders of the ill-fated Mississippi and Missouri

Railroad Company, then building through Iowa.
The problem that remained unsolved until: the latter
pert.of thoeCivil War, was to find the' best way through the
Rooky Mountains.

South Pass in Wyoming was the natural rout# -

used by the travelers on the. Overland (California-Qregon)
Trill,' This.' route wee not practicable for a railroad because
it would entail' too steep a grade * the Enabling Acts required
t grade of no greater than 116 feet rise per milt.

It was

Dodge who found the way.
While crossing the tieina with $ troop of hie cavalry*
Dodge* then ft General in the u. S. Army, located a pees with
a ridge that led from the high plains into the Rookies at a
gradient of only ninety feet per mile.

He named the location

Sherman Pass in honor of his commending general during the
War— William T, Sherman.

t, ■

Once into.the mountains it became.apparent that if the
route was to be built it would require a major engineering
triumph*

The successful completion celled for the erection

of innumerable trestles and bridges to cross and edge around
prlclpitous cliffs and the blestlag and chipping out of -tunnels
through craggy heights too steep-or difficult togo ever,
Originally the intention was.to angle the read down into Colo
rado and sweep through Denver," the center of Rocky Mountain
mining at the -time*, and then to shoot back up .into Wyoming
aiming at the Great Salt Lake Basin.

Investigation revealed

18
that this route into Denver would be too difficult, expensive,
end time-consuming.

The desire to reach the Solt Lake Basin

end Mormon tegion we* not given up though— this wee the only
really populated eve* between the Missouri River and:the Mast
Coast, at construction time.
The construction halted with the lass of Peter fief in
December, 1864, a* the Chief Engineer of the Union Pacific.
As previously Indicated, Dey had been associated with Thomas
Durant in low* in the early fifties.

It was at the direction

of Durant that 'Day made surveys into Nebraska Territory and
beyond in 1863.

These surveys -gave Durant and M s associates

an advantage in formulating and putting over the Platte Valley
route for the Union Pacific.

This association between Durant

and Oey nonetheless closed in lata 1864,

The reason for Say leaving is confused by 'differing
stories circulated afterhis departure. 'Day claimed that he
left because he could not be partner to the "exhaustive con
tract" Idea which Durant .and the Credit Mobilier people had
inaugurated on the- first 100 miles of "the Union Pacific to- ba
constructed.

This Movie contract (so-called because the "con

tractor" of record tees H. M, Hoxie) was written so that the

void was to pay" sixty thousand dollars par mile of completed
track*

Day had estimated 'the- coat of building that section at

thirty- thousand dollars pgr Mia*

for this reason Boy wrote

to Union Pacific President General John A. Mr. on December 7,

it
1864, statings
*2 do ttoi* approve of the contract for building the
first hundred miles from Omaha .wist# and. 2 do not care
to have my name so connected with the railroad that 2
shall appear to endorse the contract.*34
Grenville M. Podge* who succeeded Day, told a different
story.

Dodge reported Oey’s resignation of "...the beet posi

tion in hie profession this country has offered to any man,"
occurred because the Company would not build along the route
he wanted.

Podge could have ratlonalired the reason for

Dey»s departure in order to accept 'the post himself.

Grenville Malian Dodge (born April 12* 1331) was m
almost Horatio Alger-like character. He rose from the obscur
ity of poor New England farm-life near Denver, Massachusetts,

to become one of tha most distinguished personages in tha
civil engineering field, although much distinction came to him
from his other endeavors.
Dodge was of that generation that reached adulthood
during the time railroads were starting their first wave of
construction.

He received his degree as a military and civil

engineer In the early summer of 1851, and immediately followed
two classmate-friends to Illinois— scene of tha greatest sail.
eM'iwwwM'iwiiieg
. , „ Stewart M, Holbrook, 2 M JlSSX M Mtfil&fifl hf.li.mds
(Haw York* Crown Publishers, 1947), p, 1 6 7 7 :
EE
Grenville II. 'Dodge,
iv and, other Railway j
.p.:a.n.(

road activity.

In the course of the .neat few years, he joined

at} Illinois Central Railroad engineering patty* where ha work*
ed under Peter Beyi later surveyed along with Day tot tha
Mississippi and Missouri Railroad from Davenport to Iowa City.
Dodge then took himself a wife and settled in Council Bluffs,
Iowa,

ha a result of -hie reconnaissance and surveying be

tween the Missouri and West Coast he drew up a map and guide
booklet, showing the heat camping stops on the way went* that
was distributed through hi*, outfitting store in Council Bluffa*
His reputation became to great by 1859, that alien an Illinois
politician, looking m m

sqm

property he held mortgage to in

Council Bluffs* asked who could best discuss -proposed railroad
routes through the West, Dodge was the man. .Dodge described
the discussion as one in which his brain was completely "picked"
of *11 the Information he possessed on Western routes.

This

Illinois politician remembered his conversation with Dodge
after the Illinoian became President of the United State# in
1861.

-@odge maintained' years later, rather immodestly, that

this 1859 conversation with Lincoln was responsible for the

4'*

choosing of the Platte Valley route for' the transcontinental,
After the-' outbreak at the Civil far. Dodge an* caught

up in the conflict.

Because he bed organized a company of

mliltli- in Council Bluffs, he W W •hie to secure himself a
commission a• a colonel in the Fourth Iowa Volunteers.

Wounded

beige in battle, the first early in the war at the Battle of

Pea Ridge and again on Sherman*s March, he served -out the lest
p«rt of -the we* heeding up the Array*s Separtment of the Mis*
souri with the responsibility of keeping the Indians in check.
It was a« * Major General of Volunteers in the lottos
poet that he loft the A m y and became Chief Engineer of the
Union'' Pacific in May, 1866,

he' had accepted the position lit

January of that year upon the condition that he would have
complete autonomy to build the toad *hii own way.*

Whether

Sedge was his own nan e» not, he 'did take.the job .and five
guidance to the construction of the seed that had been with*
out' the services of Day fas m m * yeas*

Heproc ended to

speed up the building program to such a degree that three
yeas* -end ten days after assuming the. position, the sail* of
the Central Pecific end the Union Pacific were wedded on the
Salt Lake desert.
the construction of a railroad across m

unsettled

section of the continent involved a number of major problems,
eachof which by Itself could have halted things had it gone
unsolved.

The biggest problem -sms that of geographic isola

tion of the rail head.

Because the nearest railway connection

WO* at St. Joseph, Missouri, the us* of river steamboat was

Jacob a. Perkins, frail.*. Rail* and Wars The life of
General S*J|* Podae. {Indianapolis1Bobbs-Merril1 Co., Pub
lishedunder auspices of The Historical, Memorial end Art
Separtment of lowa, 1929), p. Iff*

necessary to supply the construction crews *t Omaha,

This

method of transportation woe handicapped by the necessity of
.hauling a whole year's supplies within the three-to-four*
month periodwhen the Missouri River was navigable.

Other

supplies, particularly timbers were hauled across Iowa at «
Very high cost by freight wagon from the end of the North
Western Railroad building across the Iowa prairie.

The "big

push11 of track construction came after Council Bluffs was
connected with the East by tail* which allowed far more in
the way of quantity to be carried end at a much lower price
'than the tonnage '.handled many times vie steamboat.
The Meins Indians presented a formidable obstacle
else*

They had taken advantage of the distraction of the

Civil War to go on several rampages in Nebraska and Colorado
during the early sixties.

The constant Indian threat to sur

veyors, graders and tracklayers -wee partially alleviated by
help’the Army provided.

Up until the time Bodge left the

Army he was responsible far the eradication of troublesome
Indians in the Platte Valley.

Because of his friendly eon*

tacts In the .Army this service was maintained during the Ip*
tire construction pealed.. Complementing this aeaviee were the
laborers hired by the Casement brothers {General John .and
Baniel), tha traek-leying and grading contractors for the
Union Pacific.

Moat of the man working on. tha Union Pacific

were 'Civil far veterans and*, these men under' the leadership

of many former commissioned and non-commissioned officers
serving as foreman and superintendents, made « very effective
Indian fighting force that nevex worked vary fax from their
stacked arms*
The shortage of men during tha Civil War years was
ovexcome somewhat by tha importation of Irish laborers to
carry on what could be dona under tha circumstances,

the

shortage of man was closely coupled with tha geographic iso
lation— *solved eventually by 'tha and of 'the 'wax and the com
pletion s#'« railroad into Council Bluffs in 1867.

At the

time whan a maximum effort was being expended to complete the
road (1868-69} there were "some

12,000

men...directly employed

bn the Union Pacific**
Many of the men who came to help with the building

stayed only long enough to save sufficient money to buy -land
near the railroad right-of-way*

'•ethers* 'lust enough to bring

their family from the East ■out to the Middle West* Still
others'were of the rolling-stone variety who, when the-Union
Pacific was completed, moved down to Texas to build the Texas
and Pacific or north -to build the Northern Pacific. Those
wise probably the sons of men who had built the canals in the
Middle Atlantic states■and Ohio Valley during the eighteen-

<

,

24

thirties and -forties.

These were the men who made the ”#nd-

o~track” camps the lend* brawling, notorious places they were.
Murderers, rapists# card sharps# bar-room brawlers# ex-eonviets, and even teed meat
railroad building,

they ell had eat shill in common—

that they did when -they were net working

was their business, but when, the workbsll clattered their
souls belonged to Grenville bodge end the Casement Brothers
end they worked!
The whole nation celebrated a* the silver sledge (edited
to the telegraph) smacked the golden end silver spikes into
the,tie of polished wood on May IQ, 1869,

ftspreeenta|pve« of

the government, -the officers of both Union and GentralPaeific
Railroads, the press# construction foremen and laborers, ell
cheered as the cow-catchers of the two locomotives, one heeded
west .and the other .east# touched and champagne bottles were
smashed on 'them,
pursuits.

Mot all' the champagne was .wasted in such

They were'done, • continent had been spanned# East

had met test,

Almost seven years from the time the 1862 Act

had been passed the roads were Joined,

The work was not com

pleted, however S it was almost another year of.strengtheai'ng#
filling# replacing and rebuilding before the entire route was
accepted by the government inspectors*
for use as a means of saving the Union it came a little
late, but the.road did help bring the Indian 'Wars
To serve as a moans of

c o m m u n i c a t i o n

between the

t o

a close.

c o a s t s ,

this

if did5 it cut travel time from months to days.

Serving at

a means of distributing fhemsnufactured goods of the East

m m the mid-Sest and West, §» a method of putting Western
raw materials into the last— another success.

The Union Pi*

cific did not solve ell of .the country** ilia socially, eco
nomically, or politically, in feet, it helped create some.

The new railroad stood as a great achievement of man over tha
elements, as a step in puffing the peopled of the country in

* little closer contact, M d , it made a email group of people
immensely rich.

The estimates of profit aide by the people in control
of the Credit Mobilier, ranged from a low of approximately
$8 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 to a high of nearly $44,000,000.

The only figure

that presents a breakdown with any authenticity la the high
est one, backed by the prestige of government subpeon* and. a

complete government commission investigation. The Pacific
hallway Commission conducted an investigation in moat of the
Important railroad and financial centers, bringing before it
the biggest' names in railroad operation, finance and construe**
fion. The Commission accountant reported, from aubpoonaed
Union- Pacific and personal accounts of the individuals Involved,
that the total profits made from the construction of the Union
Pacific amounted. -to $43,929,328,34..- Pae.Ry.Comm.Report. VqI.VXX, Report of Accountant william calKoun, p. 4861,

Between 1889 end 1875 the Union Pacific faced two prob
lems thit wet# to eventually bankrupt the railroad.

The first

was tha problem of bow payment of the subsidy bonds, furnished
by the government should be net*

Solution to this had to waif

until the 1890*8, after many sots of Congress, railroad pro
posals, and court decisions.
was

a recurring one also.

twice.

The other problem— Uay Gould—

He bought into the Union Pacific

Once in 1873, only to leave in the early eighties,

Slid again in the letter.part of the same decade to complete :

his work.of destruction.

There' were periods, nonetheless,

during’which the Union Pacific was able to operate fundamentally
as a railroad# providing freight and passenger service along

its route# without interference from the financial meandering*
of Gould and his cohort*,
The period from 1869 until 1873 was such a period.

Be

tween 1869-71, the same people who .had been .financially tea*
ponsible for the construction of the road were still connected

with it. Rapacious Thomas Burant had taken "his silver spike
from the completion ceremonies and left the scene,

Still **-

msining ware the Massachusetts shovel manufacturers, Oliver

and ©ekes Ames, the former as president of.the road and "the
latter as an. ia^or'tant member of the beard of directors— still
in Congress unsullied by the upcoming Credit Mobilier Investiga
tion of 1873.

With the Ames brothers, yet another important

Credit Mobilier trustee, Sidney Dillon* remained on the. board

®f ■dlyectet*.

Grenville Dodga and the Casement brothers

hid. 9 m # on to other railroad construction, ©edge to Texas to
work on the T#M9 « and Pacific.
The building group retained control of the Onion Paci
fic until January 1871.

1% art* at this time that the company

was faced with * floating debt of five million'; dollars that
was to 'imitwrd in just three months, secured by collateral
with a market value about one-third less then the loan, end
tin million dollars of income bend* maturing between 1872 and
1874,

Union Pacific stock prices slid down to * quotation

of 9, income bonds to 3at.and the land grant bond* (allegedly
'89
to be paid off from sale of lands} to bf« Two groups of
capitalists fought for control of the Union Pacific during
this period above conditions} both groups hoped to use the
road as the completing link to * truly transcontinental rail
road system.
The first group,, whose immediate success later gave
way to tha second group, could be fairly described as the
Pennsylvania Railroad party.

It was made up #f Them** Scott,

thaii President of the Pennsylvania, Andrew Carnegie, and. George
M. Pullman.

In 1871, this group took control of the Union

Pacific, elected Scott president and provoked a mangeris1
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struggle that resulted in March* 1872* in the second group
winning control in * proxy battle.

This second group was

associated with Cornelius Vanderbilt and the- Mew York Central
Railroad*

fhi. New York Central depended too heavily upon ear.

loadings from Chicago end, the West (meaning freight going last
from Omaha from the. Union Pacific) to allow the Pennsylvania
control of another of the Pacific roads,

the Pennsylvania,

through its President. Scott* already had a wedge in the
Kansas Pacific heard of diraeter#,

Control of the Union Paci

fic, 'by 'the. Pennsylvania, would allow diversion of east hound,
freight over the Kansas Pacific to. Kansas City, through to

ft* Louis end the Pennsylvania.
thus the victorious party led by Horace f* Clark* sonin-law of Cornelius Vanderbilt, saved part of the transcontinen
tal business for their Eastern reil H n e — but at a tremendous

coat to themselves for waiting, the price of the road's stock
had been driven up m high that Clark paid an average of 30s
for hie atock, which had sold at 9 joat a few months before*
Clark remained as President of theUnion Pacific until hie 40
, •*
death lnl873.
Jay Gould*a purchase of the Onion Pacific
stock* put into the market by the administrator# of -the Clark

estate* brought another ehangeinthe management structure of
the transcontinental.

aaer

■
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Jay (born Jason) Gould came of upstate New York Scot
There seemed to be some confusion as to

tish-Puritan stock*

41
tbe year of his birth (1836 or 1837).
upon as May 27.

but the day was agreed

foil of a ne'or-do-well farmer he worked on

his father's farm until he was fourteen, assisting a local
storekeeper with bookkeeping to earn enough money ip order to
remain in school.

His next atop was Beochwood Seminary, where

he was noted for hla seriousness of study and his unfriendll-

ness, while at Beochwood he authored an essay that was on*
titled, according to one source. "Honesty is.: the Best Policy}**
it stressed conscience and conscience alone' as the control of
42

individual action.

•'

Xt was while still St Beechwood that he

took his first real job— one that gut him out into the world.
Serving as in assistant to a surveyor making a county

map. Gould taught himself surveying.

When hie employer was

unable to complete the 'map. Gould «^d.' and received the profit
for the entire Job# Me aeon moved .into the tannery business,
but left it shortly-losing his half interest in' it to the
heirs of hie partner rather ’
than allow an investigation into

Gould's year OfTbirth,
H. Talbott 'and

oar*

Robert X, Warshow, lav Gould} fhm fiery, pf a
Verfe* Greenberg, 19281* p. 24. "
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•

the suicide of that partner,

Moving to New fork City* the twenty-on* yea* aid Gould
married the daughter at a wealthy grocer.

Hi* fathax-in-law

pat Gould to wort investigating the operation of a xailxdad
in which the familyownad a considerable number of thereat the
road we* turned over to a larger one at a $130,ooo profit in
a -{Batter of months,

the speculator was boxnj Gould was to 1

never b* without a railroad or at least engaged in financial

44

speculation frtwa 'that day until hia death,
G©uld*s progression begani fren railroad speculation
he moved into building reads via the'printing press# later#
becoming an actual builder, using reel tie* end etee'l.

His'

first venture into th* high finance of railroading occurred
during the fight ever' the Sri* Hailroad.
Acting as an agent fat' various clients, Gould controlled numerous Erie proxies and was drawn by. @ani*l Brew into '
opposition to Commodore Cornelius Vanderbilt to a factional
fight ever the control of that railroad,

the trie fight be

ing the beet known case of capitalistic connivance on record,
time will net 'be devoted to a blow by blow description of the
strife,

Suffice it to say that each of the contending groups

. __ j,** pp. 29*43.
|»» PP. 51-34,

used every known device to grasp control of tit# road iam

the others bribing of stockholders, legislators, end judges,
“watering" the stock, injunction end counter injunction,
end lest and net least of importance* one of the largest
stock market battles in history,

the team ef Prow. Gould,

John S, Elaridge, end James {Jubilee Jim) Fisk won the
donnybrook.

Gould and Fiak turned on the others in their
4S
group.end wound up in eenitel ell by them®elves.
Controlling the -ftfle from |i®8 until lit#- in 1872, ,

Gould acted as president of the line and was in charge of .
expending it info Cleveland, Ohio, and the oil districts
of Pennsylvania,

during tha same period he was responsible

i m in increased watering of Erie stock, raising of the
floating debt to an unmanageable figure, and a “systematic'
looting® of the treasury. 'With Erie stack-at, the highest
quotation In years, Gould unloaded $ major portion of his
holdings in order to delve into ether speculations, the

Union Pacific being one of then*
Grodineky, pp.cit.. pp.35-53,
** pp.71-74 and John Moody
of America Series, voX»

frees, 1919)« p, 88,

3 8 , 1New

Havant the Tale university

With tha purchase of the Clark shares in the Union Pa
cific in 1873, Gould did not immediately begin bln usual man
ipulations.

ilia first step was ant of assistance to the road

during the Crash of 1873.

In conjunction with tha directors

of tha Union Pacific ha was able to transform tha huge {fiat'
million dollars) floating debt into longer-term bonds*, matur1 ' 47' " '’
1'
log In 1893. Gould himself did not officially become a mambas
.

.

-

■

■

■

4

‘" #

of tha road*# board until 1874,: and it we* 1877 before ha
actually became manipulative with its fortunes.

The Union Pacific had come a groat distance..from the.
germ of a thoyght In th# minds of several visionaries^ to a

bright Iron ribbon across the Great Plain* and through the
Rookie* some 1,038 mile* in' length by 1875* it served, an area
that was just beginning to come to life. The fifteen year*
between 1875 and' 1898 were to see the end of the Frontier in
America and the Union Pacific had a* much to do with bringing

this about as any other one factor. The read was completed, it
could provide a greet service to- the people along Its route,
.but it was in the hands of that arch corporate destroyer— .
Jay Gould,

Pas.Rv.Comm,Report, Vol. 1* Testimony Of Jay Gould*
48". .
""
■
' .
Ibid,., p* '447#
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CHAPTER XX
THE
M B A S PACIFIC
AND I5ENVER PACIFIC RAILWAYS
)
'
The sister road of the Union Pacific was already enjoy
ing corporate existence when the stroke of President Lincoln**
pen Joined their destinies in the 1862 Enabling Ant* The route
'
Aof th* Leavenworth, 'Pawnee and Western Railroad whs1to he
constructed from Leavenworth to Lawrence,'Kansas, and from
th*re connecting with th* Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad
that was to run from a point opposite St. Joseph, Missouri, on
th* Missouri River to the Union Pacific lino at# or any prac
tical point east of# the IQOth Meridian— so long as the Hanni.
2
bel end St. Joseph line was no longer then,100 miles.
A
supplemental .Act passed by Congress in 1864 provided that the.
100th Meridian was to be the western-most limit of any govern*
ment land grant or subsidy and also that should the Union
Pacific quit building before that point was'reached the Kansas
road could continue on until it met the Central Pacific,

The

ambitious men baching the Kansas read were wore-than content
■with this proviso, ee Kansas at this tine was scene of a great
deal of railroad speculation.
When Kansas became a State in 1861# it had sufficient

Hereafter referred to a* the IMH,

2

See Chapter 1, p. 9.

population to warrant on* railroad 406 miles in length— and
no-.ffiore*»if it were to he a "paying* {successful) road.

At

that time there were 1,320 miles of rail lines projected by
8
railroad companies already incorporated. Although 1,100 rail*
read companies 'war# chartered by the Territory m by the state
4
of Kansas only two hundred ever laid any track. No other
middle border state could boast, however, as Kansas could by
1685# that there wee not a single farm in the eastern half of
,5
the state that was more than twenty miles from a railroad!
In 1870 there were 1,234 miles of railroad in Kansas} 'by 1880,
that figure increased to 3,104 end ten-years later it reached
i8,763. It was during these years that- the average Kansan far
.

mer acquired large acreage .end cama to specialise in one or
two cash crops,

He was dependent' upon the railroads to .carry

these crops to market end bring in the manufactured implements
which he needed.
The tP&JS# chartered by the Territorial Legislature of
Kansas, was like most corporations 'in that-it had many stock
holders} for ell practical purposes# however# it was controlled
by four men# James' C. Stone# J. H, -MeQowall# Colonel A, J,

33h®#s Humphrey# *tfc» Railroad* of
Kansas Histari
cal Society Transactions. Vol.III* 1883-5, p. 461,

Humphrey, gp. clt.. p. 402.

2ornow* jyg, sM,,.P* 135.

?
Isaacs, and General Thomas Swing.

It was this group ft! iP&d

backers who were responsible for the Act of 1862*
This group hod arranged for the distribution of 83,160
shares of W O W stock ($4,158,000 per value) from e "special

fund* to insure the passage of the 1852 Act. Shares of this
stock wont to certain prominent people# according to a list
presented during an investigation of the Pacific Railways in 188?,

IP&tf lobbyist,:J. €. Stono, who apparently handled the

distribution, would not admit the.list was authentic, although
admittedly it was In his,hand-writing.

The three names that

stood out as having received the largest amounts of stock
were *T. Stevens,* *Gen, J, H.iane," and *S« C. Pomeroy."
Pomeroy supposedly received a total of four thousand shares# Stevens, 4,100 and lane, 9,400.

this was an obvious refer

ence to Thaddeus Stevens, the leader at that time# of the
Radical Republicans in the House of Representatives, the other
two, lane and Pomeroy, were then. United States Senators from
Kansas,

During his testimony, Stone was asked if it had not

surprised him that Stevens 'had been involved} his an&wef»%%s
that at his age "nothing would cause me to be surprised very
9
much," He added that the stock distribution was not to have

Pac.Rv.Coeim.Reoort. Vol.Ill, Testimony of «I. C. Stone,
p. 1595,
8
ibid.. pp, i&9?«*98.
Ibid.. p. 168?.

36
bean considered only for th* 1862 Act, but for addition*!
legislation that LP&W promoters knew would b» needed o.t later
dates.
Unlike th* Union Pacific, the i$&W underwent name
changes from tine to tine,

the original nan*, th* ieavenworth.

Pawnee and Western Railroad Company, was adopted in 1855, when
the first Kansas territorial legislature issued the corporate
charter*' the 1P&W was succeeded by the Union Pacific Bail-

12
way Company, Eastern Division

on dune 6, 1863, because the

Act of 1862 required that the tP&W have completed at least
100 M i e s •of track Cep to prescribed standards) within two
By June of 1863, the LP&W
13
had built exactly no miles of road*
the Act Of 1864 trans
years after the Act was Signed.

ferred the right of the tP&W to connect with the Pacific Bailread at the 100th .Meridian to th* Union Pacific,'Eastern divi
sion,

A 1Change in ownership had resulted also, with .Stone and
14

his group being replaced by JohnC. Fremont end Samuel Halieii.
Almost the entire road was to be built under the name Union'
Pacific, laetern Division.
: 10

Ibid.* p. 1613.

leonaxd ». Thompson, "The Hietery of Railway Oevelopment
in Kansas,” (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. State University
of Iowa, Iowa-City, 1942), p. g,
2H*re*ft*r referred to a* th* Union Pacific, •astern
Division.
Thompson, fi£>.£li*, p.433

14Pac,ftv.Comm.Report. p.54.

.
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In March, 1669, the name of the road was again changed,
this tint to the Kansas Pacific Railway Company--the name it
1§
kept until th* Consolidation in 1383,
A possible *******-for

th* last change in name of the road was an attempt, extending
over # period from August,.1388 to April, 1870, to interest
the Congress in extending the toad to fan -Francisco and fan
■It
iisto* California, through the Colorado "Mineral Belt." the
road had reached the 133th Meridian end was eligible for no
more federal land grants at bond subsidies under the existing
Enabling Acts*
The Congress had reserved four million acres of lend,
far railroad lend grant usage#--when-statehood was granted to
17
Kansas, Th* State itself held an addition*! one-half million
acres "for the support of the common schools" under th* Wyan
dotte Constitution# hut a later Legislature was able to cir
cumvent th# intention of the earlier proviso and "donate" the
18
one-half million acres to "internal improvement." The Kansas
Pacific, or its predecessors, did not receive all of the above
land as there were many railroads in the state# all' trying

Thompson, m*J*il«* P* 10.
Ibid., p. .433, The fee,Rv.Coare.Report. p. 34# makes not*
of legislation enacted 'July 3, 1866,referring to the "Kansas
Pacific .Railroad**
17
lornow, ag. cit.« p, 137,
18
Thompson# sat., cit., pp. 27-3,
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tm e share.
The aid received from counties, townships, end cities
was ait innovation in Kansas although it had been common in

the last even during the canal-building #*** later the early
railroads els# btnefitied.

In Kansas it became a fine art*

Bond Issues were exchanged for company stock* the Kansas Pa
cific received $960,000 all told in such aid from cities,.
' 19
counties and townships.
The stipulation we** naturally,

that the road would "come through" the area that donated the
aid, in addition local eltixens purchased stock to an amount
of one million dollars* again, to secure th* railroad for their
community.

21

The .amount of money involved was close to two

million, dollars, .It would be difficult to estimate the num
ber of miles, such practices took

the toad .out of its way,but

the attitude of th# builders was

one of seeking .immediate

profits from the construction of

the road rather than overthe

long rang* of operating a successful

railroad. ,

Aa in the building of the Union Pacific, the construe-

Thompson* gg. cit.. p. 427j Zornow, s&. cit.. p. 133,
SHI
' In some cases this practice caused the railroad to change
the location of 'the surveyed right-of-way, making some towns '
prosper end others wither and die, for an interesting study of
this" situation, see "Soma of the lost Towns of Kanaka," Kansas

State Historical Society.Collectlona.Vol.XII {1911-12},P P . 426-71.

21
lorno*.,

,m»

£l£*. P. 13?«
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tion

of th# Kansas Pacific (earlier IP&W and Union Pacific,

Eastern Division) was carried out by th# exhaustive contract
system.

There was a slight refinement used by th# Kansans

that allowed less notoriety then that received by th# Credit
Mobilier,

The subterfugsuaed was the changing of the cone

struetion company name from- tine' to tine* without markedly
changing the make-up of the company membership,

The first

contract was given to Hunt end Buggiest the second wee handled
by ferry end Company! the third# which completed the road, wee
ft. M. Shoemaker end Company.

2M

The problems feeing: the builders of the Kansas .reed
were in no way similar to the ones faced by the Union Pacific.
Even if th# original route had been followed, 'that of connect*
ing with the Union Pacific at the 100th Meridian, the road
would still have bean easy to construct.

The route as con

structed was difficult only in the area approaching Denver and
even here there was nothing'to compare with, the Union Pacific*#
Cheyenne to Salt lake route.

With the exception of 'the few

miles (lees than one hundred} of mountains around. Denver the
entire Kansas Pacific line was built across the Kansas Plains.
Geography was not the only advantage.
Kansas City and St. Joseph! Missouri.# .were both eon*
Dieted to the last by rail#

In transportation faollities -then#

. Thompson, pp. cit., p. 434# 44th Pac.ftv.Comm,Report.
Vol.VII, Report of Accountant— Wiiliaa Calhoun, p* 4870.

40
ill# Kansas Pacific had the advantage of being only across the
Missouri River:from net' one, bet two sources ©f supply.

This

would have allowed th# Kansas Peclfie to operate wlth a anil*
let inventory of construction supplies had they been so inclined,
Which lends to the question of why the Kansas Pacific was so
slow in getting Its line completed*.

''the Mi'Ot; problem was th# same as 'the Union Pacific had
experienced in early years*-* lack of fish capital.

As men

tioned previously, the LPKW never did construct Any track?
John C. Fremont And Samuel Hallett were hampered by a shortage
of'personal funds,.so the Union Pacific, Eastern Division while

owned by them constructed only about forty miles of rood,
the Freraont-Hallett partnership seemed to be based
upon*

1, Fremont’s money— $2O3,O0O used to pay for the.
surveys made by M M

end tome boo million acres of lend, th#

!

81

total: asset#, of the MA$i

2. Hallett*a engineering end promotional talent— the
engineering talent was negligible 'but there seemed, to be a
good dealof the promoter in Hallett.
When Fremont and Hallett took possession of the road s
construction contract wee already in effect,.having been let

Vol. Vil, Testimony of John C

41
%

the previous LP&W owners. The new owners proceeded to

ignore this contract end to let a new one through two deeds
of trust to Hunt end ftugglea,

The two deed# of trust were

let Just'’fifteen- days apart (June it end July 1* 1863) end
were for bends valued at $5,760,000 end $7,200,000 respectively,
the bends were secured by "road built end to be built* as well
'

M

•s by lends of the company.° # sub-contract was let to Metlift which provided for the construction of forty- Miles of
track between Leavenworth and Lawrence, Kansas.

Whan the.

people 'of Leavenworth demanded exorbitant prices for their
lend end supplies because they thought their city wee .-the only
place from which a railroad could start west across Kansas,
Hallett proved that Leavenworth was not the only piece end
Moved ell the property of the Union Pacific, eastern toivision
to Wyandotte (now pert of Kansas city), Hanses, end proceeded
to build from there a lib# distance of forty miles to -Lawrence*
if profits were to be made, they would not toe made by person*
unassociated with the railroad or its constructors!
Halleti’s promotional talents were best exhibited toy
the methods he used in securing, rails’for the* forty mile sec
tion from Wyandotte to Lawrence.

Thomason,

op.

He got the iron rolls toy

£^1., p. 433* -

1%

telling the manufacturer that the road was graded and ties

laid# neither of which was tana# and that the government bonds
would be forthcoming when the iron was delivered {another un
truth).

He borrowed fifteen thousand dollars from a St.Louis

banker. John 0* Perry, by reporting .-that the line wee graded,
tied, end the-iron paid for*

In this fashion he was able to

transport hie borrowed rails to Wyandotte and atari his rail
26
road construction.
Unfortunately Hallett was .to bp,denied the pleasure of

celebrating the completion of the forty-mile segment of trick.
His chief engineer* JU C. Taleott, hid been reporting poor
building 'practices on the road by letter to President Lincoln.
When Hallett discovered' this* he- fired Taleott}'Taleott fired
ST..........

beck* with a repeating rifle* killing Hallett* This allowed
the -it. Louis banker* terry* to step in as president of the
company and Fremont began to he shunted aside.

By December of

1864 he had sold out M s interest for hie original $203,000
investment,

ferry and Company finished the Hillett aub-con-

tract on the fatty miles to .Lawrence and gat the read accepted

by government inspectors so that subsidy band* were issued
October 28, 1865.

Ibid.. pp. 436-7 and .
many of John t. Usher, p. 16!

Report

Teail

ibid.. pp. 437-9,
Sftl'
,
. iMi** P.- 440 andJEaa.gy.Sjyss.RiEsli. Vol.VII, Testimony
of John C. Fremont#
Fremont, p.
p. 384
3847.

With the abdication of Thomas Hart Benton*a son-in-law,
Fremont, the fortunes of the Kansas Pacific Cat this time,
still the Union Pacific, Eastern Division} wars in the hands
of a group of St, louis capitalists led by the- banker Perry.
It ties, this group who finished the read# although Peary did'
hot retain hie supremacy es the largest shareholder.
the serious wort of construction on the road began in

m

the summer of 1869,

the branch from ieavenworth to tawxence,

started that summer, was completed the following May.

In the

meantime, the main line was continued on west reaching Port
Riley in October of 1866. .the next two years saw 268 miles completed from fort Riley to Sheridan* Manses* where work
was halted for over » year.

Sheridan (mile-post 409) was near

the 109th Meridian, the point at which the government subsidy
bonds ran out.

After the failure of the company to interest

the Congress in an additional road -to California, probably
through Union Pacific pressure, the Kansas Pacific (so named
after December, 1869) continued building without federal bond
subsidies.

There was assistance from the States of Kansas and

Colorado in the form of land grants to encourage the comple
tion of a. railroad to Denver.

Pac.Rv.Comm.Report, Report of ^earaisaienees, p. 55
$ 0 .......

Thompson, ££. cit., pp.442-5.

44
By April, 1870, theroad extended to Kit Carson, Colo
rado, end early in September of that sane year Denver was
reached, making « total of 638 miles front Sanaa* City (formerly
USWyandotte), Kansas, to Denver.
M i l e building across M e . Sanaa* prairie the railroad
had encountered a problem not experienced by the UhionPaclfic.
Many towns had grown dp in Kansas, especially in that part of
the State east of the 100th Meridian, and each wanted to be
“on* the new railroad that wi* coming through,

feme were will*

ting to pay fat’the privilege while others exerted political ,,
pressure.

One such Incident occurred in connection with

Lawrence and Topeka.
Hallett hid demanded $300,000 to enter Lawrence.

38 '
Uni*

ted State* Senator lame* H.'lane, of Kansas, fought to have
the Union Pacific, Eastern Division enter both Lawrence and
Topeka without any payment and actually secured Congressional
legislation authorising the toad through those towns.

Hallett

still refused until Lane decided that Hallett should be re
quired to remove every log and stump (used to save rock ballast)
from M e new roadbed, unless the line entered both cities*

Pac.By.Coma.Report. Vol. 1, Testimony of Artemas H.

Holmes, p» I20*

3al
M i * i P.- 428,

In ■

* matter of days* Hallett informed lane of the road’s intenI

’

’

tlon of going through Lawrence and Topeka.
Another source claimed that this same incident, which
caused the road to bypass the town of Xndienola, Kansas, was
caused by 'the people,of Topeka, making "the railroad promoters
an offer they could not refuse.» When the toad by-passed ,
Indianola by three miles the people In that community actually
moved their town to Topeka*

Other towns were laid, out and constructed for the sole
purpose of profiting from, the end-of-track business opportu
nities. ..Such a town was Rome, Kansas, one mile west of fort
Hays, where William F» (buffalo Bill}.Cody and a William 'Rose
started a general Store in Hay,, IS#?*

Buffalo Bill was in

strumental in the promotion of the town end it soon enjoyed
the end-of-track boom previously noted on the. Union Pacific.
Within one week the town had grown to a population of'over

five hundred, within a month to two thousand* M Its peak,
the citizens of Rome were mostly "business man, soldiers*.
railroad graders, gamblers, hunters, cut-throats, end proati34
tutes." like the boom town* on the Union Pacific, .Rowe soon
lost its population to the next end-of-track further west,

“Some tost Town* in Kansas, * Kansas Historical Society
SallafeMan*, Vol. XII (1911-12), p. 4 2 8 . .........
P* 439*

but unlike * number of the Union Pacific towne, Mem# disap
peared— no on# stayed.
Of the Kansas Pacific*® 638 Mi# length* 394 miles
were constructed -from Kansas City to the 106th Meridian with
the assistance of federal land grants, like those given the

Union Pacific end a bond subsidy of sixteen thousand "dollars .
per mile* The Denver extension (from 100th .Meridian -to Den
ver)* a distance of 244 Alias was constructed without any '
35
federal.aid.
Despite being well over one-half as long as the Union
Pacific it had a total capitalisation of only 832,088,950.

This consisted of $9,437,950 In stock Odd $22,651,000 in bonds
36
•t sis, seven and eight per cent interest* This was * lower
capitalisation per mile of track constructed than the Union

Pacific, hut the difficulty in building the letter was far
greater.

The builders of the Kansas Pacific did go beyond:

the pale of normal financial capitalisation, when, In July*
1866,^ 'they issued bonds mortgaging the future income of the
new road.

The definition of "ineo®#* was so worded 'that the

bonds-‘took preference ever the toed** preferred stock; this
Psc.Rv.Comm.Raoort. Vol. 1, Testimony of Artemas H.
Holmes, p. 120......
36
Ibid.». Report of Commissioners, p. 55,

At
method was used to enable the Company to Issue', bends in ex
cess of the amount stipulated by the Enabling? Acts* which
ceiled foe the issuance of a number equal in amount to the
37 _
federal subsidy bonds.. ' this type Of capitalisation is diffi
cult to rationalize* even though,-in the opinion of a recent.
-authority!

"The farther the line progressed the more effi

ciently it was'constructed*,** The coat per mile went down
IS
as the speed of construction increased.*
The connecting link between the UnionPscific and Kan
sas Pacific rdads was a line 106 miles in length* *running from
Denver, Colorado.*, to Cheyenne# Wyoming.

This'road*, the Den

ver Pacific Railway.#, was, 'important for one reason, only— it ■
gave the Kansas Pacific an attachment to the transcontinental
market, if the Kansas Pacific could c ontrolit.Of all the
Pacific, roads it'was the least expensive of the lot* being capi
talized in its entirety at six and one-half' million dollars—

.

four million dollars capital stock and two and one-half million
dollars in mortgage bonds*
On March a, 1869* an act was signed by .President Andrew
37

'Ibid.* Testimony of Ariemes H* Holmes, pp. 121-2,

36

Zoznow, pp.. clt., p, 137, '

39 '
Pee.Rv .Comm.Report. Report'of the Commissioners, p. S3.

48
Johnson allowing a land grant to the Denver Pacific Rail
way and Telegraph Company, along with permission to M i d
4#
from Denver to Cheyenne, The act further stipulated that
the new toad was to operate

04

an adjunct of the Kansas Paci

fic, hut not to be operated by the Kansas Pacific.

There was'

to be, as in the Kansas Pacific Denver Extension Act, no bond
subsidy from the government and there was ait added restric
tion that no more than $32,000 in bends could be issued' pat
41
mile of track construeted. The company had bean incorporated
by the Colorado Territorial legislature and. was composed
largely of cltitans of Denver, who were anxious to see Denver
connected with the transcontinental railroad, after suffering
the humiliation of net being included on the Union Pacific
route.

Former Territorial Governor.John Evans was instrumen

tal in forming the company .and securing the completion of the
Hite, by making arrangements for 'the Kansas Pacific to furnish
the rails an# tolling stock for the road after the company had
■42
graded 'an#, tie# the roadbed. Thus the Denver Pacific hallway
and Telegraph Company was able to complete its line into Sen*

....—
-- -— -nn-J* 40th Cong,, 9*4 Sosa., Vol. 40,
Appendix^ Eaws of the &nited States,* Ship. CXXVXX, p. 321
4*lbid,
*„

st««iey frit*,

jBMtommt

(New York:Prenfiee-Hall, Inc,,19411, p.21b. Frit*
report*# that the Union 'Pacific provided the iron and rolling
stock. He apparently confused the Union Pacific and th* Union
Pacific, Eastern Division,

49
ver and start service in June, 1870, while the Kansas Pacific
•
'
ea
was net completed to Denver until August. After its comple
tion the Denver Pacific became fat All practical purposes a
part of the Kansas Pacific*
»ith its line completed, the Kansas Pacific attempted
to operate with two distinct disadvantages:

the first was

the advantage the Union Pacific had a# to route and. connec
tions.

The latter road had the shortest route across the

nation, east to west*

The Union Pacific connections at Coun

cil Bluffs, lows, and Ogden, litah, were el special note*

The

roads that connected with the Onion Pacific at those points
were mutually interdependent upon the Union Pacific and vice
versa.

The Kansas Pacific had interdependent connections at

Kansas City, but at its western end the connection with the
Union Pacific at Cheyenne was anything but interdependent*
^Any freight or passengers exchanged between the two roads,
except local business, could be said to have come right out
of the pocket of the. other.

For this reason, the Union Pacific

was not prone to devise any sort of split or sharing of this,
business— in spite of the efipilailens of the Enabling Acta.
The other disadvantage that operated against -the success
of the Kansas Pacific we* its risky debt structure*
lem was to almost destroy the road*

This prob

The Union Pacific was

80
quick to point out that this problem of finances was respon
sible for all #f the Kansas road's problems. The Kansas Paci
fic in return felt that the financial condition was caused
by the terser*a refusal to pro-rate business met from Chey
enne— thus allowing the Kansas Pacific to share in the trans
continental market.

The. Union Pacific retort to such an

offer was to remind the Kanaaa Pacific ’
that the road between
Cheyenne, Wyoming, and Ogden, Utah, was the meat expensive
at that time, of any railroad line in; the country (which was ;

true} and that the-Union Pacific had to have all income from
44

It 'to make It. pay.■

Regardless of the causa, within two years after its
completion the- Kansas Pacific baa in trouble financially. The

Panic, of 1873 pushed the road over the precipice and if was
forced to default on interest payments.

The total bonded in-

45

debtadness at the tine amounted to $28,588,000.

The only*

arrangement agreeable to the' European (Dutch and German) bend
holders w;a:s the creation of an issue of bends covering the

overdue interest end establishment of a receivership.

This

Thompson, pa* pit,,, p. 4Sb, Thompson finds the Union
Pacific argument "wholly sufficient.48
Pae.ftv.Comm.Report. Vol. 2, Testimony of Artemss Holmes,
p. 133*
..
;*
**N§»
1
IfeM** p* 132•
,■

funding egreement forced the Denver Pacific into receivership
alec, as the Kansas Pacific held a controlling share of the
former's stock in# bonds.
The two receivers appointed represented 'the 'two differ
ent classes of securities involved in the crisis,

Henry Vil-

lard acta# for the foreign bond holders and Carlos S. Greeley*
for the Junior securities— bonds other than first an# second
mortgage— on the Kansas Pacific Boar# of Birectors,

The two

receivers acted in this capacity from the time cf their ap
pointment by the'Kansas court in 1870 until Just before. the
Kansas Pacific— Union Pacific consolidation in 1880.

During

this period tbs financial condition #1# not improve to any
degree an# the roe# remained in a ■
’’chronic state of insolvency.

A study

of the Kansas Pacific .reveals that its history

was very similar to that of-the- Union Pacific.

The-Aon instru

mental in the construction of the. former were of like attitude

to the ones associated with the- Credit Mobiliex.

The' construc

tion was fraught with as much corruption as that of the Union

Pacific, only the story ia no* as well known. The Pennsylvan
ia Railroad group that hi# an Influence through Thomas Scott's

presence on the.Kansas Pacific boar# were not interested in
the solvency of the read# only in the use to which the road
'""'m

"°"m

m

ibid., Report of Commissioners, p. 55, end Ibid.. Vol. X
Testimony of Artemaa Holmes, p. 135.
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could be put*

The Panic of 1873 and the ensuing receivership

caused the Pennsylvania group to lose interest in the road and
to concentrate their holdings east of the Mississippi ftiver.
Although burdened with debt and a dismal future because of
Union Pacific competition* the Kansas Pacific was potentially
a valuable road.

It served a rich territory with a rapidly

growing population and had adequate depots and yard facili
ties at both Kansas City and Denver*

It only needed to be

removed from, under the stultifying weight of its poorly fin
anced debt or have business increasesufficiently to handle
interest payments and debt retirement*
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THE UNION W t m m m O KANSAS PACIFIC RAILROADS, 1875-1880.
The years 1875-80 were packed with the manipulative
meanderlngs of Gould and the men who opposed him.

This half-

decade saw Gould reach the top and bottom id speculative fin
ance, have success and utter failure, and at the end of the
period, control moat of the major railroads west of the
Missouri River.

The conflict between the Kansas Pacific and

Union Pacific seemed almost as irreconcilable as the conflict
eventually solved' only by the Civil War.

In reality the prob

lems between the two roads were a result of Gould’s actions
effecting each of the lines,

lie began the period (1875)1as

the majority stockholder in the Union Pacific, trying to force

the Kansas Pacific Into submission. -He ended the period# as
the majority stockholder and bondholder in the Kansas Pacific#
forcing the Union Pacific to submit to him.

The years of 1875 and 1875 mare marked' fey only two in
cidents of more than ordinary day to day railroad competition.
In the spring of 1875 ©cold met with Thomas Scott# Pennsylvania
Railroad representative on the Kansas Pacific Beard of Direc
tors, at the Continental Hotel In Philadelphia.

Purpose of

the meeting m s to discuss Gould’s idea for a consolidation of
the Union Pacific and Kansas Pacific.

Basically the proposal

was one #f each r©ad issuing ©ne-half of the new stock to ■
thei* present stockholders; Scott was not interested 'an# the
i
Idea was dropped* :One season Gould did not prats far consoli
dation was that he had already entered Into an agreement,
lessening competition between the two roads, bsnefitting the
Union Padlfia*
the .Kansas Pacific and the Burlington and Missouri
(Flattamouth to Kearney, Nebraska, subsidiary line of the
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Bailroad) had sponsored a bill
la the Congress that would force the Uhlan’Pacific to pro
rate any business coming onto ltd lines from other railroads.
Gould seemingly offered the consolidation ae eh# alternative;
the other being an agreement "to prevent competition and con
troversies... for the mutual protection at their mutual inter*
a
,
■
eats.'' The agreement gave #11 local Colorado business in the
■

Kansas Pacific with the Union Pacific receiving assurances
that the Kansas Pacific would net attempt to compete f w busi
ness coming from west of Cheyenne on the Union Pacific,
further agreed to set rates, mutually, and to
■g
ferencas by arbitration.

they

all dif,

Vae.Ry.Comm.Report. Vol.l, Teatimonyof Jay Gould, pp.
448-502
;
Pencil draft entitled, "Chandler’s brief of Amend.to
K, P. Sill asking pxo-rata,*Vol. 17?» Uodoe Papers.

•man-

until-he

roads.

The Burlington, the other Pool road, painted out
4
Gould’s insincerity and the Pool was reinforced,
'Therether noteworthy event; in-this connection, which
occurred in 1876, was Gould’s philanthroptccreationof a
funding mortgage to take case of the•Kansas .Pacific’s float
ing debt, although he was net.« stock or security holder in
the Kansas Pacific at this time,

Gould offered the credit of

himself and other Union Pacific hoard members to relieve the
Kansas.Pacific directors if the first mortgage bonds defaulted*.
Mis offMir was accepted.

The a m mortgage covered cash advances

to the Kansas Pacific directors to pay the first mortgage bond
Interest for 1876, to beep the receivers, Viliard and Greeley*
from foreclosing upon the. road*. The Kansas- .Pacific- board' used
various junior securities* including some Qenver Pacific-stock
from their treasury* to act as collateral for the short-term
notes maturing in February, 1877,

The natural thing happened

in February— the notes could not be act* so Gould and- .hie
friends acquired an interest in the .Kansas- Pacific.

--

-A break in market prices* probably 'brought on by know!**
edge that Gould bad acquired an interest in-the Kansas Pacific*

Julius

II m
Pennsylvania 'Press','1957h

■»
Pae ,Rv,Comm .Report, Report of the Commissioners, p. 56.

ajjewad him to purchase even more junior securities at lew
prices— '"same income bonds for example at twelve cents on

t

.

the dollar, •* This opportunity caused Gould t# enter into a
struggle fos?.,the control of the Kansas Pacific, where him
primary opponent was Henry Villard* the receiver whose major
responsibility was protecting the interests of the Suiepaa®
holders of bend#, m
Denver).

the Denver Extension (100th Meridian to

Gould himself had very little invested.

He owned

a small part ef the bonds on the floating debt* a-small part
of the Funding Mortgage, end a substantia1 part of the junior
securities purchased at recession prices*

The other members

of the Union Pacific board owned an equal amount (less the
junior' .securities)*, but. Gould controlled thelr uae of the- ;
securities.

His first move was to"put.the railroad in which'

he had: just become Interested’, into a mere'difficult finan
cial position.

' ” ’'

-■The Kaneas Paelfle* beginnlng in 18??, had aterted t©
display a phenomenal business growth* -to off-set this Gould
made peace withthe Iowa fuel rends and agreed to move all
Union Paclflc buBiness through Council Bluffs.

The upsurge 1

of KansasPaeific business was the result of a number of factors which were not iff#©h#d;by Gould’s action at '®©«aeil

Grodinsky, jg, 'Cit., p. tW-%

60
Bluffs,

They were* ill An increased migration ##■ people Info

the Kansas Pacific tradeaxeaj (2j the development of the
Texts end Mew Mexico cattle drives bringing the animals to

the Kansas Pacific's linej ill the growth of the city a#:
Denver in population end trades And, (4) a period of leafeased
rainfall, resulting in more farming .and larger crop production*
; Another move by Gould to siphon ait further business
from the Kansas Pacific was aimed at the valuable bullion
traffic of the Coloxado mining districts.

A: small and rela~

lively insignificant railway had been built by' a group of
Coloradoans from longmont to Denver to handi® orb' and bullion
fro® the mine* in ihe area * By 187T* Gould and'the Union Pact*

fie had gained control of the Colorado Central Hailroad and
completed it from longmont to Cheyenne, thus giving the Union
8
taelfin. access to- Denver. With thi*'direct competition to the,
Denver Pacific, 'the Kansas Pacific was effectively blocked
from the lucrative bullion traffieand the Union Pacific ac
quired it, 'The Kansas Pacific fought back with' the only means
at its; disposal# * further financially hurtful lowering of
rates.

This was what Gould sought# but it caused Villard to

take separate «e tien.
T
Holmes, pp

Keoart.Vol. 1, Testimony of Artemas

Guatavua Myers,
York* The Modern

weary, 19

f
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Villard had but one course open ta him
b# stopped.

If Gould

was

fa

The key to any Kansas Pacific power was its con

the first
instituted

nection with Denver and* since Villard represented
mortgage bond-holders of the

Denver Extension,

he

foreclosure proceedings in order toprevent Gould from com
pletely destroying the road’s value.

Gould retaliated

:

through theSt. hauls directors, having the Kansas Pacific

apply ta the courts, fa* the removal of Vii*'
lard and Greeley as receivers. The application* based upon
the .contention that Villard and Greeley hid shown partiality
toward the bond-holders to the detriment of the company’s
interest* waa successful. Villard denied none of the accusa
tions hut ha made a special point of the fact that*: if. the
foreclosure"want through*, the KansasPacific would be reorRailway Company

ganizsd in favor of the first mortgage bondholders.

g

The Spring of 1878 saw Gould* his collaborating direc
tors of' the Union Pacific, and the ft. Louis members of the ■
'
Kansas Pacific board (including Carlos Greeley) purchasing
more'Kansas-Pacific securities--atoeIt, income bonds* Denver
Extension bonds* Funding Mortgage bonds* and even issues of

W

Kansas Pacific, branches.

Gould, at

this time* still maintained

1800, (Bostons Houghton,
ompany,
s.'282.
10
Pec.Rv.Comm.Report, Report of the Commissioners, p. 56.
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absolute control of the Union Pacific, owning two hundred
thousand out of a total of 370,060 shares of Union Pacific
. U C d t h « » * . . f.»U» - A I M M , M U *

th. . «.« 1 » »

share owners.
Villard and his interests were

not. standing

atlll

either. Me hod induced the German bond-holders to increase
their holdingsand at the same time he received help from 'the
Burlington and Santa Fe Railroads in an attempt to control.the
Kansas Pacific. Xt was at this point that Gould pereuaded
Villard to enter, e securities .pooling arrangement that would
eradicate any danger from foreclosure by the Junior securities
controlled by.Gould and hie associates.
The. first four months of 1878 witnessed a tremendous
spurt in naifration into Kansas with some 56,000 people coming
in by rail alone and there wet# indications that an additional
12
150.000 would follow before the end.of the year.
This popu
lation influx would have meant little .unless a solution could
be found to the Kansas' Pacific*® financial problems. The- pool,
arrangement offered by Gould was designed to solve that prob
lem but at a price.
,

''

Ifald.. Vol. X, Testimony of Jay Gould, p, 451.
X2*
. letter* J. M. Eddy to. G. IS. Sedge* Hay 29* 1878, Podge
Papers. Vol. It.
'''.
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Gould was of the opinion that the many different
classes of Kansas Pacific securities "lad to such inextrica
ble confusion" that the only answer was to put all the securi
ties in the hands of one man and "than cut the principal'
If
,
down." Gould induced ten other Kansas Pacific securities
holders to create a "common pool or fund holdings of securi
ties taken it a fired valuation" with their interests In the
peel :to he proportioned to the amount of securities and stock
,
id
if
contributed, 'the participant* bound' themselves tot
i

1.
2.

Secure payment of Kansas -Pacific.bonds and,
Set schedule of rafeset which securities might
be entered into the''pool..''
:
'’■ '
.3. apportion new stock according to holdings of
various subscribers topool agreement. ;
.4# Provide for reorganisation of Kansas Pacific
■m sound 'basis., '
5. Unite the two roads {Kansas Pacific and'Union
Pacific) in order that' they could far operated as
one road*
The last stipulation was Gould's price for putting the agrea'

;

I

S

'1

'

1 '

;

'
tf"!

1

Pac.Rv.Comm.Raport. Vol. I, Testimony of Jay Gould,
pv 453. '
‘1 "
'
. '
■
..
Stoart Paaaett. Railroad Reoraanlaatlon. (Boston> 1908),
p* 226*' Besides Gould the other memfaers of the proposed 'pool
were Frederick L. Ames, Robert S. Cerr, Sidney Billon, B. M.
Edgerten, Garios Greeley, Arieses Holmes, B. w. Lewis,. Jr.,
Adolphus Meier,' .John B..ferry, Jbhh P. Usher, and Henry Vil
lard. Frederick Ames was net a Kansas Pacific security holderj
hi* contribution was 3100,000 cash. -; See Ames Testimony before
Pacific Railway Commission, Vol. II, pp. 646-7.
Thompson, All*

SIS**

f* 4if,’_

aent through, and: one to which Villard grudgingly agreed..
At that time the funded debt of the Kansas Pacific
amounted to $27,727,350 with rates of interest varying from
elk to ten per cent, but averaging about seven. The annual
16
interest amounted to $1,892,134.30. Under the.- gaol agreement

the securities would be reduced to a first mortgage over the
antis* roid, a government lien over part of it, and $4,800,000

17.
in capital stock.

The key to the whole arrangement was de

pendent upon the entrance of -all Kansas Pacific, securities
holders into the pool And dome were not prone to do eg without
the guarantee os protection of A strong lien.

Hid a few se

curities holders been allowed to remain outside the pool their
securities would have attained a value greater than, the same
18
proportion of new securities. In order to force the. laggard
holders Gould started foreclosure proceedings under the In
come Mortgage (junior securities) terms, thus threatening to

take the -raid away from first mortgage bond-holders.:* Villard
and other European bond-holders, pool participants until then,
rebelled and began .Maneuver* of their.own to save their into-.
rests in the road.
In June, 1878, .# new board of directoro wes elected' -

$.*., P* 457.
17Thompson, ££«
.... £.$.„
..
Ibid,
18
'

with membership made up primarily of holders of stock and
other junior securities*

The newboard proceeded to appoint

All' the Union Pacific officers to like- posts in the Kansas
Pacific which resulted In overt Union Pacificoperstian of
the Kansas road.

This put the Colorado Central, the Oenver

Pacific, and the emaha Bridge {railroad bridge from Omaha to
Council Bluff8),beeides thetwo main lines, under Gould con
trol.

All income was to hi- pooled and apportioned out oh a -

basis of the previous year's {1877).income.• The Union Paci
fic. received the major share (72.85^) while the Kansas Paci-

■

’ It.

fid was given less thin twenty per cent*

It was at this

point that Gould fait powerful enough to-oftempt foreclosure
under the income Mortgage*

-

it took, Villard until the fall of that yea* to gain
control of a solid majority Of the QenverExtension bonds.

Then he 'hid counsel file foreclosure proceedings» He wee > ■
able tp garner sufficient support from the Burlington and
Santa. f% officials to.assure the removal of the Hthve* -ia«*
i

tension from Gould's dominance and thus emasculate the Kansas
Pacific as a power feel*. The stroke that almost caused Gould
to b*««fe and '«un '*»«« Vlllt*#*# announced Intention' to connect

Pae.Hy.CeffiB>.Repo*t. Vol. II, Testimony of fired#*iek, 1*
Ames, p. 'mW» 15# HiSffws* % ’p i -66# -fa* complete apportion
ment break down end: method use# to arrive at the figufes fixed.

FIGURE NO, 2
908b m I878— BETWEEN UNION jFMBXfMS# 0 6 M M M 0 0MHVM&*
DENVER PACIFIC, ANB RECEIVERS OF KANSAS PACIFIC. ,
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m
the eastern end of the Denver Extension to the Sent# F«,
giving that read pit entrance into Denver, end building * new
road connecting Convex to Ogden, Utah,

This would hex* placed

a new transcontinental road in competition with the Union
Pacific, a road parallel to it in ittr own back yard, Villard
■
'80;,'
1
:
'Had discovered a touchstone. The .pool agreement dialntegrated and Gould began
to forge
curities

abusy

winter of marshalling his force*

a complete mastery over ell the- Kansas Pacific se
he could lay hie hands' on before March, 1879, the

date the foreclosure decision was to he announced by the
.

.

.

.

court*
the only alternative open to Gould was to buy the
Denver Extension bond#' controlled by Villard.
r

this, he -had to find

a source

of money,

»

i

«

in order to. do
;

Gould, unlike most

of the Gilded.Age financier*, was never directly associated
with any large banks or financial corporations} haalways
operated

with Mis

own money os

from M s personal associate*.

that which
The winter

he could, command
of 1878-79 found.

him without ''Spy further fluid-'asset* and faced With, lowering
Union Pacific stock market prices— his only-ready .source -of
capital,

letter, 6* m . Dodge to 1* T. Baldwin, January 31, 1878,
Dodoa ^Paper*. Vol. 19,
opinion
the m.id
•*.j,.. -a-Dodge.«*•
w “ «|fccm.jm
'MtMh- of
aft■&*,the
±
m
tothat
a
.
greatest single threat to Union Pacific superiority was another
coed
‘
“ tciflc at Ogden.
odinsky, m .
p. 171
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Gould capitalised
pleted coffers,

011 M s

reputation to fill his de

Early in 1879* he released an announcement

that .a controlling interest of Union Pacific stool had been

sold by him to a combination lad by Union Pacific and Kansas
Pacific President Sidney Dillon and .another iotild financial
associate* Russell Sage,
and Gould began to

Union Pacific ateel became active

sell at

telco the price it had been

a

few

■it. ; ■ . . ■ = ■
days earlier* 2n a short time Gould was eble to accumulate

five- and six and ono-helf million dollars
in cash-easi* that was.used to carry out his plena for the
somewhere between

i

Kansas Pacific.
Gould

want to Viiisrd “end'told Ma he [Gould] wee

tired of fighting -and ...was reedy to accept* Villard*s terms
' ■
' 2*
’
for consolidating the Kansas Pacific mortgage* ■ Gould offered

pay the interest arrearage on the Denver Extension bonds*
in full* provided the Villard group would allow the new consolideted mortgage to be funded at ate tether than seven per
cent* Villard agreed to. the-•terms: and the lien against the
Denver Extension was removed before the Federal District
Court for Kansas convened In Kerch,1879.
this put the junior
to

to #• h. h»

' letter* G. M.
'

"

•

:

llllfapl Msmlm.* v°i* is*

p* s®a

1879*

Dodge explained

f thevloed” m Gould,

Che sale «« relieving
,28,'.

Clark* February 18,

foe Papera. Vol. aed.

"Letterbook 1878-1881

securities in control of th* entire road and Gould proceeded
to buy than out* so that near the middle of Kerch an '.associate
of'Gould** wrote* the *,,,u.p, has got th* K«P,
without
84'
any •if#**** .Gould paid « total of £1,310,825,48 for the re
mainder of th* junior securities not already held by himself
1

25

1

Of hie associates*
the next move was designed by on* of Could'scl osa
associates, John P. Ushet*' after fefe listened to what Gould
■SS'
wanted as to commutation rates on the securities* Certain
securities war* taken into the mortgage consolidation «t pre
ferential rates— especially thosewhieh GouXdowned entirely*

the new consolidated mortgage bonds wer* issued in May with
the avowed objective of,cresting * uniform security end
effecting a saving in interest* The market'interest in the
■

i

i

*

new Kansas Pacific "consols,0 as they were called* was instan
taneous and remarkably god#.*
three things?

Th* acceptance

based upon

fi) the lowering'of the total bended indebted-

ness some £3,700,000 plus the Intelligent, monay-aaving, low
ering of the interest rat®, which had varied from seven to- .
;27
ten* 'to e uniform six per cent* (2) the improved management

Letter 6* II. Dodge to J. .M.Iddy, March 12, 1879* Padae
Papers* Vol. 386, "ieiterbook, 1879-1881."
,
-m m m
:Voi* t» Testimony of ley Geuld*p.497
26
jbld., Vol*X2i, Testimony of -John P. Usher* p. 1698*
^Ibld,. Vol, I* Testimony of Jay Gould, p. 496,

w
and financial condition of the Kansas Pacific plus the proapacts for a continuing Increase in the road*a business from
28
the movement of thousands of settlers iota itsterritory?
and (3) the anticipation of collecting the interact arrearage
from the pre-mortgage consolidation Denver intension bonds*
Demand for the "consols* was so greet that they jumped to a
potation e f .46 over per shortly after they were issued,
*

/

t.

Having dealt with Villard* Gould's attention was turned
to one of the railroads that, -had joined with Villard in ttyi

f

ing to keep Gould out of Kansas Pacific control, the. Burling
ton had been looking

tm a -way to

compete with Gould at O&nver*

The St. Joseph and Denver City Railroad Company possessed a
charter allowing it to-build to Denver across northern Kansas,
By 1879' it had. laid only i few; miles of track extending out
onto the Kansas Prairie from th# Missouri Rive* and was con
nected with ft*; Joseph by a1railroad bridge owned by the St,
Joseph Bridge Company.

.Burlington official# began cautious

inquiries about the ownership end the possibility' Of extend
ing th# road to Gamer*. Upon hearing that news*. Gould fall
on the virtually worthless road 'and bridge* and in June. 1879.

purchased all the stock of the former and bonds of th# latter.
Thompson, go. C M * . p. 468,
'SUlflgg j&SB&Eg.* Voi.II, p. 283.

n
This was 8 foolish move in i way* for It showed speculators
that Gould might be frightened into buying property of ques
tionable value*
: That year turned out to be a busy time for Gould.

It

began with the St. Joseph episode and; was followed in August
by an ocean trip to Amsterdam.

The purpose of th# trip was

to purchase from Dutch holders, be# and one-half million
dollars in benvet failfid bonds.

He arrived m hia personal

yacht in Amsterdam one morning, had-' breakfast, asked the
bond-holders to » luncheon matting, purchased their bonds
at T4, and started hit return to the United States that after
noon.

Purchase of the Denver Pacific bonds made him'majority

bond-holder end in s position to control any foreclosure of
that road,, a possibility suggested by th#' Dutch holders when
!
•
**
'
INI
they- bed not been included in the consolidated mortgage*
With the majority of- Denver Pacific stock held in the
Kansas Pacific treasury, virtual control could now be exer
cised over the Denver area* The only value of the Denver

Pacific or its stock was the measure of worth a consolidating
'
D!
company might place upon it. 'The. road did.serve as the only
connecting link between Denver and Cheyenne for a time* but

3:Jjjap, By.Coma.RaDort. Vol. I, Testimony of Jay Gould,
p. 4:6§*
' .'
'
tfpJL
J M d ., P. 491. '

m

the completion of t parallel track by the Union Pacific-owned
Colorado Central greatly impaired its value. At this junc
ture the Denver Pacific stood only as a pawn ia A bigger
game— to be weed by Gould to five him the Moat benefit*'
The only abateele to compieteecntrol of the Denver
area was 'the Atchison* Topaka and Santa H lease of the Den
ver and Rio Grande Railroad*a line into that City* In retail*
ation fat th* Santa F**s assistance to VillaM# Gould moved
to block 1* out of
t*> September he m m ible to pur
chase half of the Denver and Rio Grand#** voting trust certi
ficate* at twenty-two cents m the dollar in a contract -that
called, for payment In cash* Kansas Pacific stock at 66, or
32
Kansas Pacific ^console*' at ©t* With controlling Interest of
the Denver and iio Grand# tucked into Ml portfolio* Gould
broke the Santa Fe lease of hi* mm retd** tracks Into Denver
and th* ©tty was hi*. Alt four of
major roads coming
into th# town were controlled effectively by him, or hit
associates, In the case of the Colorado Central.
Gould was now ready to repeat his overtures for a con
solidation. This time he controlled the Kansas Pacific and
made the offer to the Union Pacific. The exact terms offered
by Gould were never, revealed, although It wa* known ’'that he
«

\

Grodinaky, pg. s£S** p.-174.

-f

•-

f

*

valued Kansas Pacific, compared with Union Pacific, very much
higher ...than th* *eet of the [Union Pacific] dtreetore did.,.
The Union Pacific management, even those closely associated
with Gould in the Kansas Pacific, agreed •perfectly" with M e

m hie desist he eliminate competition, between theaeeivea end
other xoede, but feelings were split on the relative value of

m

the two seeds*

'

The seal opponents wexe the directors.fm m

m

led by P. Gordon Qexter. Another way of looking ti
the offer wea to aasum* that Gould tod- net yet pit'the Union
Pacific directors in a poeition where they had' to agree to
consolidation, They could still intex-change freight at
Council Bluffs and ©gden* Their short route m s still the
heat and in high demand.
\
As the pressure of Gould*a consolidation echoes began
to build* he became more susceptible to the maneuvering© of
railroad speculators mo owned railrosds near the Kansas Pa
cific, ’One sum was ©liver Ames, nephew of the ©liver Awes
of Union Pacific fame. Be .had* upon the death of .hie name
Boston*

sake, inherited a few hundred share* #f Central Branch Union
Pacific {originally the Atchison end Pikea Peak Railroad)

33 Psc.Ry.CaKim.Reoort. Vol.ll, Testimony of F, Gordon
Beater, p, W 2 . ...
Thompson, aa.
pp, 458-9,
35 Murat BojateadV felfa of lav Gould. (fn.pHs Idgewood
Publishing Co., 1892), pp. 184-5.
1
J
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stock in 1877*

By 1879 he had added to th# Inheritance to
36
the extent of controlling theCentrsl Branch road. This was .
the road that 'had taken over the rights of the Hannibal end
St. Joseph Railroad Company to build e line under the tern*
of the 1862 Act* no longer than 188 miles in length, joining
the Leavenworth* Pawnee end Western as that road 'built toward
the 100th Meridian to connect with the Union Pacific in Neb
raska. ■ M

the Kansas Pacific (successor to the teavenworth

road) did net. make the connection with the Union faciiie* the
Central Branch line ran a hundred miles out onto the Kansas J.
prairie wait of Atchison and stopped,
‘-After witnessing Gould*#-treatment of the ft* Joseph
and ©enver City, when threatened with e proposed connection
to fanver by an Eastern road* Amea approached Commodore C. K.
farrlsOn* President of the Missouri Pacific, and suggested
that the ban of them build the Central Branch to Qenver and
operate the -'Missouri Pacific over it* ■ To prove his- faith*
Ames started building s- 288 Mile extension onto the one hun
dred',length of the Central Branch at M s m m expense.-, this
antagonised Gould and he started preparations to build- brenchss
of the Kansas Pacific into Central Branch territory*

Ames

retaliated by' repeating M s Garrison offer to the, Burling,ton

and Rock island roads and: Gould succumbed,*

Gould met with

Ames* supposedly at the behest of the Boston directors of the.
37
Union fttfclfte* Ames asked far end' **e»lv*<i in-Gcishar* 1679,
an sv*»a#d «f ®23S per share or $1*826,300 for 7*616 shares
which consisted of five-eighths of the total stock of the
read*

m

The financial condition of this roed was faxfrom
food*. The Central Branch had not paid a dividend in six
yearns its bonds had been in default for some tiflej and* as
iaie as 1878*. the stock had been selling for §* little as
ton cents on the dollar. An objective examination years after
«**# found no ",..conceivable justification for iheprice paid
by Mb* Gould to Olivet Ames fat the stack,,,,"

m

'

In latex years Gould refused to- admit he had been
best*d~-fooiad* yes* but not defeated*

*i saw a freight

train *nesfn®1 out of every station*, and sometimes we had to
wait to get by** he said* in reporting on the trip, over the
Central Branch before,ha- purchased it.

He was to learn only

Sftit purchasing the .res# that th* management had "saved up*

Ife&Sl.* pp. 803-6.
; Thompson, Iffi, M i.* p* 063,
39
. Pac■Rv.Comm.Ranort. Report of the Commission, pp.100,60
,

' Ibid.. Vol.I, Testimony at .Jay Gould, p,.§2S«.
•

>

*

•

j

i

■m
freight over « eeveo to ten day period in order ip- impress
him with the large amount of business the road wss doing,
Ames reported that Gould did .net make an inspection trip un*.
til after the purchase of the roed end that freight had been
saved only one day to make Gould "feel food* about his
4#:’
. ' • , ■
.
,

>

«

if

pm*

'!

^

whether the road was a goad or bad buy was inconsequent
................................

!

•

.

I

.

'

-

:

.

tlaito Gould. 'He found a way to make the road pay its first
*
\
L
>‘ ■ ;
■4SI ,
.dividend In six yearst he leased it to the Kansas Pacific.
In that

mf

any losaes In operetion were borne by that rood'

rather .than, the owner of the Central Baanch.
By 0ctober 23, 1879, Gould and Russell Sage were able
to move the "Boston dieettaif*** P* ffesfleMt.,ft#**#** Elisha
^

•»

«

Atkins, Frederick L. Aetea, and 1* H» Bakes, to send a letter
'

i

•

!•

*

askingfor the investigation of the feasibility of a consoli
dation :o f ;the’Union pacific>and Kansas Pacific.

Grenville~

Dodge and Solon Humphreys, both closely assoclated with Gould,
were the aen selected io investigate the "equitable condi
tions"upon which a consolidation would "promote the interests
v:t.-T,,7 ni]i^xl)iil:Mr:nfi :n:

. Ibid., Vol. XX* Testimony of Oliver Ames, p. 811.'
4 f .............
-.Vol*..!* T**%i«i»ny of Xiy Gould*'p* $37#

of each” railroad. “as well ;«s those at Hi#

«,*■.«#-

Gould later said that Dodge was "one af th© bast engineers and
the beet railroad man" thit-®ent*ai tssMit hid *§»«*
Humphreys "had lived in feint Louis and was conversant with
'
'44
hath' af theae properties," Gould’s feeling was that they
wear© "two disinterested men* whose sola responsibility was to
inform the directors what would constitute * "fair consoll4S ■

ditiefc-,*

In 1879, Dodge was In Gould’s employ end'had been
since at least 1873.

Dodge seemed to be Gould’s engineering

advisor with the responsibility of handling branch and exten
sion construction in addition tofinencial and directorship
‘46
arrangements, While Dodge had not been a "great believer" in,
7-

f

i

f

the' proposed consolidation earlier*it would have been diffi,■
.... ':
47
'
cult for him to have opposed It at that tine*. Hodge’s bio
grapher seid that "Gould'came to depend upon him

bodge in

.letter, G*M,0odge and .felon Humphreys to Union .Pacific .
Director*, January 16, ISftO.l’I.atterbook, 1878-1881.“ Oodoe
Pe.oers, 'Vol., iff, The. original esctobor 23rd letter seems to
hive been lost. 'Hie letter cited here acknowledges that letter
and quotes it, in its entirety,
4>w».w»sww-™pTrac, Voi* I, testimony
. # of
., Jay
... Geuld*p.d?7*
.
46
letters G.M. Dodge i» frank. S.Bond, Vie# President of the
Tires Pacific ftailroad andGecrga Wolcott, Chief Engineer of
,
the Union Pacific Railroad* dated April 7, 1879,and December 22,
1879, respectively,#ietterbook,1878-1881*s Oodoe Paoera.Vdl.38fe,

r

'

J&i&* better, to S.H.H.Clarfc from G.M.Dodge,February 1,

All. things save the financing of the roads, although Dodge
formulated many of the capitalists plans for consolidation
48
and extension,”
‘ Humphreys,

the other

"disinterested* party to

vestigation, was a similar personality.

the in

He wasdencrihad by

another railroad official of the day as one who "...reflected
.4f ■
:
the idem of Gould*" Acting, ilk'1879, as one of Gould*s
"operating chiefs" he wet president of the recently Gouldconsolidated Wabeah, St.iouis and Pacific Railway Company
when assigned to look Into the proposed Union Pacific - Kan
sas Pacific merger*
the examination that bodge .end Humphreys were to make
consisted of looking "...into the accounts of the rood and
... [familiariring] themselves with -the character of -the
country, .end the connections end the amount of business that

wee likely to be built up on the rood in the future." " if
ouch « comprehensive study could have been done by badge in
48Perkins, jaa, &X&,, xii.
49cited in Grpdinsfcy, o&.clt.. f , '-.240*
50lfel£.*P* 24 and Talbott, ijfi, cit.. p. 118*
f*Ey.£saB*MRIOl* Vol.Ii.Testimony ofFrederick L.
Awe#*

two weeks. It was faithfully done* because between Gctobe#,

13791 and January, 1880, date of the coneolidatiofl^Bedfe was
absent from Hew York fo* only that length of time.
while Bodge ond Humphreys may not hove left New York
during that period, Gould did, .fit fatly November he made a
trip to Missouri to see Co»aodore C. 16# Garrison, owner of
the Missouri Pacific, to discuss their mutual problems,

iifoen

Gould bad blocked Garrison* a move ta gein control of the Cen*
tral Branch iu Gctober, the Commodore had purchased control
of a: narrow gauge road, M b M i f f in length, extending weai

fxm Leavenworth, Kansas, between the Kansas Pacific and
Central Branch roads, On November 13, Gould bought Gsrrison*s
Missouri Pacific, 300 M i f f in length, Iron St, bout* to Kan*.
-

'

I

sas City, for three million dollars, and the Garrison Intereat in the narrow gauge Kansas Central Railroad for $479,GOO,
The price paid for the Kansas Central was, as in the case of
the Central Branch, blackball, but the Missouri Pacific was
$Pr
e good: buy# oven ft M o $750 per share.
Gould was 'if control of a rail network that hod connac"Sflt-'
An axemination Of the Oadae Papers. Lettesbeoks.Oiariee#
and correspondence fails to ravaal thatBodg e was away from
New York except -fat a short period around the and:, of. November
and early December, He did not return to Council Bluffs for
Christmas Mat' year, which nib unusiial,
'

.''

'

.

bdf' tt* CaiMBidaliMt*

»*_

R o b e r t !$§**> Riegel, *‘The
1879-1900,0
Missouri
Review. Vol. 18 (1924), p. 25.

m
tions 'm p m east aa Buffalo, HewYork, and #». far watt (ex
cluding tha U Mon Pacific) aa Denver and Cheyenne,

He had

only to complete links to Saw York la the east and' to Salt
lake city m Ggden .la; the nest and' he would' have! had « rail
road of truly transcontinental proportions, capable of' des
troying the refflolnlnf walue of the Union Pacific, ..
In order that he would not be left holding any virtu
ally worthless stock Gould turned ever his controlling in
terests in the .Kansas Central, St, Joseph and Denver City',:
.end St, Joseph Bridge Company to -the Kansas Pacific Treasury
making them branches or aubeidihfie# of the Kansas Pacific,
At-the same time Gould was able 'to remove 29,979 aharea of
Denver Pacific stock from trusteeship by likewise depositing ■
$1,500,000 in Denver Padflc;;funding bonds he 'hid purchased
bb _
\
*
in Amsterdam, The Denver Pacific stock was then paid to
.Gould in return i m the above subsidiary stocks he hid Just
placed in the Kansas Pacific Treasury.
very flrmj he

could afford

Gould’s base was now ■

to wait 'for- the Union Pacific

people to come to him, under M e conditions.
Gould changed hi# tactics,- from th#t af pressing, .to

m waiting game. He began talking in grandelse terms of build-''
ing an extension of the Kansas Pacific from Denver to Galt'
, „

W l w „ - l>ln

y

l. » ll. l, w ^ , l | W l , , , > H , .

ww

\ - r

-*

'

i-

*
Bepor t ofCommission,

p,55*

m Ogden M i mm tod mmmm started paralleling the
36
Central Pacific to &m Pjpencisco. When the tooeton group* of

Ms*

Union Pacific directoars approached him In left Beeeator of
1879 assenting to hie September offer to merge, he refused
to do so, no ting tout hie *lnttoset« hM',eto«to6»*' to re
ported ttot to- even offered toe directors one million dollars#
cash, if.they would let hi® out of toe merger,
the half-d«c»de between 1875 and 1680

mm-Gould mo#

rifiee victories in seversi bottles in order to pvt himself
into position to win the consolidation wit*

Villard showed

himself to to inflexible when the interests of hi* bend-hold*
ars were involved and aide Gould do right by them, 'the
“Master Manipulator* was forced to take ever several worth
less propertie# in order to pit toe Union Pacific into e
cornel and an ito knees. By Geeamber* 1879, he occupied a
very strong position end to was ready to make toe

m$% of

■ Fulton, Eelc
(Sen Franciscoi a , »,
Robertson, 19247T p p . ^-30.
57r ’
.
sg J&M-# V«4* 1# Testimony of Jay Gould, p. 47?*
Ibid.. p, 485,

it.

W
ftit CQNSC&XOAfiOi MB' ttt NSW ROAD
By January, 1880, Gould was ready to move.

Me had to#

potential to drive too Union Pacific out of too Transconti
nental market.

By Joining too financial destinies of to#

Boston group of directors to M s , he insured tool# eventual
t

1

tf

consent to merge at M.# terms,
■

;

.

-

Th# Boston group tod* in lot#
: '

-i

1 *

-

December, lift*, relieved Gould of some of to# extra (beyond
controlling interest) stocks and bonds of hia recent aegul*
sitions.

Gould, along with Russell Sage and Sidney Billon,

was in santtel Of #11 of the toiild Middle-iHastern holdings*
By January of 1813* toe Union Pacific directors, Frederick 1,
Amea* F, Gordon Baxter, Elisha Atkins, end E, H* Bitot had
to####, involve# with 'to# Kansas Pacific, 'Kansas Central, St.
Joseph and Denver City, and the Central Branch U M o n Pacific,
although their main interest ml# still to# Union Pacific.
'Could tod 'aold them the totorlti#* at toe cost which
was way below pax.

In this way the Boston group stood to

'

!

,*

*

*

*

5

profit, proportionately to# same as Gould from toe proposed
f

consolidation.

,' !

'
1

?

Whether guided by better Judgement or fear
'

'

'

•

)

I

of what they knew 'Gould would to* tot Btot## directors con
tinued to hold back to# to# beat terras they could get for
to# Union Pacific.
.;i#e,Rw,G#to..Raoegt,'Beoort of the Commission, pp.58-9.
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The price .of K a m m Pacific stock had been climbing ..
higher each month since February of 1879.

After selling as

low as 9 1/8 in January,.it made a forty point Jump In April■

to a ^dotation of 89*- Th* offar by Gould to' consolidate in
September had caused an additional eighteen point upward'
.2
surge. The market growth continued into th* new- year.
By

January, 1880, there was

talk from Boston of a soon-to*

be-developed cause for a further advance" in Kansas Pacific
'§■

On January 6, Kan*#* Pacific stock passed Union

stock.

Pacific in price on =th* New York Stock Exchange; Kansas
4
Pacific closed at 86 and Union Pacific at 84 T/S.
.

.

Gould soon became greatly "irritated with the Union
Pacific people for standing out ...from consolidation at ’
hie
terms."

Hi* threat te build a Denver-Salt take City or Og

den line still hung like a storm-laden cloud over the pro-.
ceedings.
„

It was this threat that caused the Boston directors

» . i „ » h *,„» W

« W dl,

«.

January with little apparent success.

0b
New York Times; January 1 - December 31, 1879.

,lsm lialfl M&Utex. p * a Moines], -January i, 1880;

#

;

Ibid..January 7, 1880 and New York Times;January 6,1880.
5
,
pee.Rv.Comm,Report. Vol.il; Testimony of Frederick L.
Ames,6g, 6il*
,
This is based upon supposition. Nowhere in.’the available
sources Is there a statement of the demands which’Gould made be
tween September,l879, and January; 1886; A reasonable assumption
ii that as-hi.fi: pefiitian grew-fitrei®#* so did the value wbifk -he
laced upon the Kansas Pacific. This is not, however, reflected
n the meager agreement.
j

f
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On January 14, 1880, a meeting was held In the drew**'
.1nfi room ef Gould*® New York town house,

Present, in addition

ta Gould, were Sage, Dillon, Ames, Baker* Dexter^ and .in ail
probability Solon Humphreys and Grenville Dodge*
Atkins was absent, but cognisant of the meeting.

Elisha

8

Consolida

tion was not discussed; it was # foregone conclusion with
everyone resigned to it*

the question under study was what

the terms ef consolidation would be,
’■ Gould presented hie arguments for fixing the value, of
the Kansas Pacific stock on e par (or better) with: the Union
'

Pacific!

(1) the Kansaa Pacific, extended fifty miles fur

ther east than Union Pacific, giving it fifty more miles of
rich agricultural land from which to draw business; (a), the
Kansas Pacific was 2,000 feet closer to sea level, on the
average, then the Union Pacific, thus providing better agri
cultural territory end lees trouble from winter snow storms;
(3) the Kansas Pacific bed terminals at Kansas City end Den
ver valued: at $2 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 .and $1 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 respectively; .and.
’
;■
9
(4 ) the Kansas Pacific branches were extremely valuable.

mmmm

T

Pac.Rv.Coffue.Raport, Vol.12, Testimony ef Frederick 1,
Amec, p. 6687
Ibid.. VeJfc:,!*, Testimony ef Elisha Atkins, 757-8,
9" / •"■ '■
•*
■ ;
Vel.* 2, Testimony of Jay Gould* pp. 585-4.
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Th«s» were all good arguments and built « case difficult to

' F* Gordon Dexter, some years l*t«r, claimed to hove
*
'
■
'
:
ptm*mtod tli* infotmation that caused Gould to enter the

mexaar #0-the t«ros the Boaton arouo fm#

Between ttiii

October and January meetings It# had found out that the Bur*
lington Railroad intended to *t*»t‘f.'buiigli*jt progxa® in
Nebraska and on west at least to Benver. ' Such a plan would
shatter the strength of both roads if they remained indepen**
dent*
A memorandum of agreement was drawn up oa follows s
Kansas Pacific Railway Company,
i 'Mew'Vo»k# Jan*Y 14, 1880,
MSMOs of terms of agreement for consolidation of Union
Pacific with Kansas feeifie in' which the Denver Pacific,
Saint Joe ft Western, & Union Pacific, Eastern Division,
ore Included*
-All necessary papers, end any further agreements-to be ’
prepared by Judge Billon on his return, the Union &
Kansas Pacific, with all theie respective.assets ini1
properties and liabilities, axe to be put together at
par* ef their respective capitals - $36*762,300 R
*10,000,000, to which is to be idled: the capital of
the Sever--Pacific, $4,000,000 making the capital of
the Union Pacific Railway'Go** as the -we#' line shall
be called, *51,762,300.
;■
■the Denver faeifid iipltii,* now «**.iaa#t of the

’ Ibid.. Vel, II*. Testimony of #* Gordon Dexter, pp,7G4-6.
11
.
■ 1,
jPaid., Vol. II, Testimony of Frederick 1. Ames, p.668.
Met#' that an error in addition wac made? the total *51,762,300
should have been $50,762,300. This was subsequently discovered
add corrected*
'
’
'

06
to 60 used after conversion into
.Railway stock to
pay for share# «nd bonds of St,Joe & Western ft.ft.tst.
566 Bridge# an hereafter stated, & for other purposes.
The St,Joe & Western R,R, lot mart,[9 *8 0 ] Bonds and
stocks to the extent of » controlling Interest in the
same to be: bought of parties now owning it, at par,
for bonds & $ 2 0 ■
a share for stock - payment to be made
in U,P,Railway stock,
■
''
The road to be i«t*ed;te the ®»p*Sailwfty #e# -for
the. interest on 1 st »o*t, bonds, or otherwise as nay
be determined* The Bridge if St.#..Jneephls le be
bought of.parties now owning controlling interests
in the bonds & shares of the sane, at par, .for bonds
with .the shares thrown in# & payment to be node either
In •haeee of U. P.Railway, ■at p**# or K*fyS®n# [solid#ted]
mart. bonds# at par#.
,
the Onion Pacific, Sastern Giwtslen,[raeaning Central
Branch Union Pacific] is to be taken at cost ta Hr,
Could, 6 paid for in same securities that he gave,
via# about one-half in K*P,Con,mort,bonds, & one-h#lf
in new U«P. 6 per. cent, Trust bands* both at par# -

%i[iM|Se|0 B» [age]
fredk, t, Ames
*. *»#■ P M # #
S
f*. 6. Baxter,
ldnay Billon ,
jfcf ■

'

f

'.tm days §fter the tentative consolidation agreement
Mid been drawn.* Grenville Bodge and Solon Humphreys addressed
thair answer to the October
•

23

request for *f*ir and equitable

I

terms* for such a consolidation*

-

i

I

;

When asked later whereBodge

and:Humphreys had been during this period, Gould indicated he
;■1 1
i'
.
1
,
*
r
"did not knowi * that he might have ’‘seen* them .but did not

:

.
■ ■.. "IsThe Boston director# were

talk' of the consolidation.

H&ftf* Testimony af Jay Qould, Vol. 1, #►*. 477,

oppar-

ently more interested in the survey because Frederick 1,,'48>#»
is
admitted talking to both men about it.
the report was purportedly to be "as an extensive an

I***,,- .. «-» «h. ,«i«* * . U « ,

»d. (jhidh

ran to nine volumes and took over a year to complete).

the

Dodge-Humphrays survey report was two hand-written pages in
4

length and "by asingular coincidence* was "a mere zeproductiott/of the terms contained in the agreement of January 14,
IS
1880, executed.at Mr. Gould’s house.* the important part of
the. report was to be found in the summary and' concluding sug
gestions that the two roads should consolidate-on a share
16
for share basis into the Union Pacific-Railway Company*. .Aft
4
bodge and Humphreys saw the two roads they were equal in everything, physical condition, earning' capacity, and indebt
edness.

The only dissimilarity was.their, difference in .
1?
•
length. With -the reception of this report Sould,had •ob

jective"' approval for his consolidation terms.
Public reaction -was not long in coming- when word of
the consolidation began to circulate,

Humors of the impend-

., Testimony of F. L. Ames*. Voi, 11, p. 6 38 .
, ibid.. p. 637.
AS
P*l23l Hl^toe^l8Wle6^!ll»iu^^lS|lBSe|erlf*
Apl>*n^ * '
letter- G. M. bodge and Solon Humphreys to Union Pacific Directors, January 1 6 , 1686, Podtta Paaere.Vol.3 8 6 . "Letterbook 1 8 7 8 -1 8 8 1 ," p . 253.

17ikM *. PP* 253-4.
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ing conolldaiion had been rampant from the tine Gould began
actively manipulating the fete of the.'boo roads*

Each new

rumor had caused renewed activity on the hew York Stock -tx*
Cheng#;, with regard to Kansas Pacific stock end the price
Reporters often sought out prominent m

advanced each tine*

members of 'the Union Pacific hoard fee verification or re*
pudiation of the yarious rumors.

It wee for lust such a

reason that a Staff member of the hew York Times wrote of
trying to confirm a rumor reporting that the directors of
the Union Pacific had been "in session in the offices of
that company** for a week* supposedly discussing a merger with
18

the Kansas Pacific*

19

He reported that*

Hr. Russell [Russell Sage?] in particular asserted that
the story was made out of the whole cloth,.,. He added,,
that negotiations of the sort indicated were not only
not in progress, but had never been'.in contemplation,
though in his private Judgement -the idea was a good one*
and he had no doubt that such ft consolidation would be
effected in the remote future**
But, the report continued:* sine# 'Kansas Pacific stock was
still booming*
There were ,,.indications that the parties most in- .
terested had been playing havoc with the'truth* end
several responsible gentlemen, who generally manage

Hew York Tlmaa, January 19* 1880*

Ibid*

to keep themselves infowned os to. financial matters,
told the TIMES reporter that they knew this to be the
case,”
There ^had been a report on the flight of January If
that a merges had been effeeted— it was this report the' re
porter free.the New fork Times was trying to confirm, along
with a dispatch from Boston.

Members of the Beaten Group

of director* had returnee! to that city saying the “merger
had been effected with only the drawing up of the detail* causing the delay,*

Apparently the Boston director* were

not a* close-mouthed about the merger because of their un
happiness with th* way it had been foisted upon them*

“Jay

Gould bed finally induced the Union Pacific to take the pill
after sugar-coating it," one of their number wee reported to

22
have said.

The Boston Directors were able to see that the

merger gave the Union Pacific a great advantage “in connec23
tien with Gould’s south-western system of roads,"
Whan confirmation came, the New York llama, attacked
the consolidation doubly— once on the front page in a news
item and again,’editorially.

The front page story repeated

the earlier statement of the “Boston Director" and ascribed
confirmation to • "New York resident Director, who ...was

90
24
also to officer of the Union Pacific Company.* The report
wee accurate in *11 respects, save on#,

'The article refer*

red to ten continuous days of negotiation that ended on
25 _
January 16, 1880. The use of this date was an attempt to
.

support., the £>odge»Humphr«ys letter (same date) -as being the
crucial lever in the consolidation negotiation,' when their
letter obviously was drawn up to support the tentative eon*,
solidstion agreement of January 14.
'The article surmised, rather caustically, that the
result* of the consolidation would h#i

(1) The Union Pacific

would have two outlets-* Omaha end Kansas City— rather than
lust ona.

(2) Since the Union Pacific was required to pro

rate all freight from Omaha— it seemed a certainty that■
Gould would move most of the Union Pacific business to the
East through Kansas City (where no pro-rate law applied) and
onto his own Wabash system,

(3) The final result would he

“the eventual complete monopoly of transcontinental business
by J»y Gould.“
Editorially the paper was even, more pointed' in its
criticism of the agreement.

The tech taken was that the

"" !l,'rir,,,^ 4 :v nn:xr";:"'1T:;::

ibid.. January 20, I860,
25
Ibid,
26
Ibid,

*• :r- >
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large corporations of the nation .(railroads particularly)

mate combining inti conaolldating to a point that monopolies
mete resulting and the rhetorical question was asked?

Is

th# public beginning to regard consolidation and combination
synonymously with monopoly?
Going on to point out that the latest consolidation,
’
of the Union Pacific and Kansas Pacific, raised .the Question
*

once more.

■

*'

Protection of the "vested and speculative" inter*

eats was insured by the terms of the agreement, but where,

the editorial ashed,'ware the Interests of the public pro*
tected?

4

further observation was that, the "West will feel

most deeply the malign effects of''the ‘Gould System,* hut ■
the traffic of a continent will also suffer,"

As if fpreset*

inf impending doom for recalcitrant corporations the editor*
ial concluded that, the "companies cannot complain if the
way finally chosen [ for solution] by Congress be not. alto*
3(0

gether in consonance with their wishes."
the investing public reacted also on, January 20, the

day the consolidation was confirmed? Union Pacific fell off
one and one-eighth points te 9S& and Kansas Pacific declined1

92
four points to 103*

One source attributed the declined to

the realisetion that the new teed would declare m
dividend.

stock

The decline continued for the nett several day*.

m

During the ten day period from January 14 to 24, t .
number of significant events transpired In connection with
the consolidation.

An important one already .mentioned awe,

the Dodge-Humphrays raport-letter of January 16*

the news-

leak of the twentieth was another and* although editorial
comment was vitriolic, neither the government no* the govern
ment directors of the Union Pacific .made any move to stop or
oppose in any way the proposed consolidation*
It was during' this period that John P. Dillon, Gould *s
•hie attorney* was drawing up and ironing out the final con30
solidation agreement. It would seem that 'the news leak on
I

January 86 was probably an attempt it "running it up -the
flag pule* to see- if anyone would salute"— as a gauge of
public end governmental opinion— .if such things were con
sidered during the "Gilded Age**

.

The flnpl move made during-this preparatory period
was the resignation of Jay Gould fro* the boards of both the

Ibid.,. January 21-31, 1833*
30
_ Si£*&*Sai«iaiaSi* Vol. I, Testimony of Jay Gould,
pp* 483-5.

©a
Union Pacific and Kansas Pacific Railroads.

He did ibis

apparently upon the advice of Dillon because of how it would
look with Gould representing both parties to the consolida31
tion. Gould’s resignation, dated January 12, 1333, effective
January'1©, lie©,, woe not announced until the'early after*
"

noon of January

m later

Ml

that awe afternoon Gould was

elected to serve on the board of the new road--the Union
33 ■
Pacific'Railway Company.
According to the testimony of one of the Boston ©ire®*
tors, Frederick L. Ames* Gould did not submit his resigna
tion print to the night of the fourteenth when the tentative
34
agreement to consolidation wee made*- This action on. the
pert of Gould was later characterised as a "confession of -'
35
conscious guilt,0 ' the reason he resigned was because he was
going to sell his various branch lines to the old roads**
Union'Pacific* Kansas Pacific, and Denver Pacific— and be
peid in stock of the new road*

While M s none did hot appear

on the Union Pacific stockholder list between January 1 end'
20, 1830, Gould still owned 27,000 shares of that toad*a
^^nuM«Ma»^uanr»isie».uKr.’

Ibid.,Vol.11,Testimony e# Frederick i. Ames, pp.666*7.
3dl»
'Ibid.,- Wei, 1, Testimony of Jay Gould* p. 516*
33

Ibid.

34,
iblrd,. Vol.II, Testimony of Frederick L. .tees, p.667.
35...
Ibid.. Report of Commission, p. 62,

stock Along with 73,342 shares of various issues of Menses
36
Pacific stock. Retention of his. position on the boards of
either road would have side him hath e buyer end s seller*

m open conflict of interest. Gould say have resigned either
upon advice of counsel or it the behest of the boards of the
consolidating roods.

Which one is not important because the

neve was not made until the agreement had been forged} his
selection, to the board of the new reed.was assured.
the consolidation agreement of January 24 was in
.reality a "carbon copy® if the memo drawn in Gould’s home ,
Just ten. days before* with the exception that fl© mention
w»« made of the various, "cheap-piece" branches unloaded by. '
37
,
Gould, The new board of directors consisted of the men who

had had chairs on the boards of the. two old.-.roads plus Solon
38
,
Humphreys and Grenville Bodge, Since the agreement required
that a director ."must be the bona fide owner of at least
fifty shares of stock it* the consolidated company,K it may
38
be assumed they, met the "legal’* requirements.
The new, toed was 1*820 miles In length. Mth' the Union
I,

,:m

i , ' U N ' T ^ T . r x . n ,

Ibid.. Vol.1, Testimony of lay Gould, pp,518,474 and
37See_AppendiK, p,126, for entire .text of Articles ,af
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fselfIs asking tip well over on®-half of that total (sea
Figure 3).

Th® cities of Gmaha, '{Kansas City, Denver, and

Ogden were the wain terminals and points whose business
could be expected to naturally be the heaviest (see sap,
P* 93:1*
FIGURE 3.

-Union pacific Railroad * ** * * * . *
Kansas Pacific Railway * .. . . * . .
•Leavenworth Branch of Kansas Pacific *
Denver Pacific Railway . .* *..*.* * *
total length

* 1*042 miles
.
339 miles
.
34 M i e s
*
106 miles
1*321 M i e s

the combined bended.debt of the two roads equalled •
*1 2 4 ,2 1 5 ,9 0 9 .6 0 (see Figure 4 * p* 9?) which averaged
*6 8 ,2 1 3 .0 2 per mile.

'.

The debt of the Union Pacific was made

up of first mortgage bonds (Government lien), sinking fund
bonds* land-grsnt bonds* coileterel-trust bonds* end Omaha
Bridge.bonds*

The debt of the Kansas Pacific— Leavenworth

Branch--Denver Pacific consisted of first mortgage bonds
(Government lien).on the first 394 miles of the Kansas Pacifie, Leavenworth Branch bonds* two issues of land-grant bonds*
Denver extension bonds* intone bonds*, funding bands, end; over-

Dbd'ae -Papers. Vol. 170, While not dated this w«s
apparently apart of the working papers Dodge and Humphreys
used
writing their letter of January 16, 18B0.

£S£*6x«Si2aS»SasaLl« Vol. I* Testimony of Jay Gould,
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due interest bonds.
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Pacific

m s

*

The average debt pee mil# m
» '

=

*
.

the Onion
'

lowered somewhat, but, of enures, the average

oe. the Kansas Paclfic was raised,

the pet effect of spread

ing the debt eve*' more miies of t#»ek plus the removal of
any competition helped raise the revenue and profit of the
now #©ad;#
FIGURE 4:
,
♦funded Debt, including principal, end.- balance of
int*r||t due to the Unlit# ^tttes;, January 31,
.Mileage
Union Pacific, , * #

Mount

Per Mile

1,042

§ 88,472,391.10

$ 84,906.32 '

1,821

$124,215,909.60

$ 68,213.02

Kansas Pacific end
Leavenworth trench
and Denver Pacific
Total

it would seem #t first blush that the bee roads were
not similarly suited to combination because of the dissimilar
ity in their financing,

the total amount of capital steels

was $46,371,650 which '*va*a«ed $25,574,?? per «iie {see Fig
ure 5, p, 983,

the point of interest wae the difference be-,

43 ' '
Bodaa Papers. Vol. 170,

44

Gould testified {with his records) in 188? that this
amount was *35,162,518.50. Pac.Rv.Gomm.Rsoo;
lac«Rv.Comm,Report. Vol. 1, Tosti
mony ©f Jay Gould, p, 8®i*
-

98
tween the/per mile average of capitalisation of the Union
Pacific and the Kansas Paclfi c-ieavenwocth Branch-Denver
Pacific, the former was almost three times as large as the
letter.

This wee dee to the feet that the Kansas Pacific

wee built over what might he celled "easy" terrain, while
the 'Union Pacific went over some of the most difficult to be
encountered in railroad construction anywhere, added to
which hod been the additional burden of the Credit Moblller.

m m m &.
heed

Mileage

Union Pacific, , , . , ,

1,042

Kansas Pacific end
ieavenwerth Branch
h 693~\

45
Amount
$ 36,762,300 $35,280.51

9,809,350

12,592,77

Total
1,821
$ 46,571,650
Outstanding as above 9,809,350
Kansas Pacific stock in Treasury
191,750
Denver Pacific stock in Kansas Pacific

825,574.77

Denver Pacific * * 106 J

Treasury • « • • * * * • * * * * *^*2S^,tSSS.
Total « » . » • * ,.$14j
It) absorbing the- Kansas Pacific-Denver Pacific com*
pier If wee necessary to increase the capitalisation of the

Dodaa ■j^twara. Vol. ■170.

new toad by fourteen million dollars over the capitalisation
eg the Union Pacific in order to exchange the new read's
stock for that of the old Kansas Pacific-leavenworth Branch*
Oenver Pacific,

This was done even though the Benver Paci

fic stock ($3*998,900) and a small amount of Kansas Pacific
stock ($191,750) was already in .the Kansas Pacific treasury,

to has been mentioned, the jptnvef'Pacific stock hid

m

real

vain# except that which a consolidating road might place
upon it*. Sincethe Kansas Pacific wholly owned the Beaver

read the stack could have been ignored, hut -was notw
the .earnings of the two roads ware not comparable
(see figures

6

and

%

p.

100),

'the Union Pacific had paid

,dividends since 1876, bat the Kansas Pacific except'for *
few good years during the 1867-79 period, had operated at a
loss,

the overall deficit was $11;,.130,771* - The enviable

financial status of the Helen Pacific was due toits short
route and its position as a connecting link'Within the 'trims*
continental system,

The financial problems'faced by the

Kansas Pacific during these years were largely the result
of poor financing and the policy of challenging the Union
Pacific in rat# ware*

increased population in the- Kansas

Pacific trade ires was just reaching the point where if
would help the road*

Neither road had paid any interest an

the Government debt. Hf thp too,;, only the Union Pacific'

wae in * position to have paid anything during the years
since its completion.

It was apparent that the roads were

not of equal value and this explained the reluctance of the
Boston Directors to agree te the consolidation.
FIGURE 6

J5zs=sa
Gj
I Ta)|.49/|f
1880**

1.3
aa,:4s®ii34

1883

ikafem

2 4 ,2 5 8 ,8 1 7
2 2 ,8 2 3 ,8 5 4

7 *7 Mil
11*9 1 8,0 1 8'
1 1 ,7 7 8 ,4 7 4

•The Union Pacific had been paying dividends since 1876hut had net been paying the Government lean or interest
on it,
’ ■
i
**Th» first year the reads operated as e consolidated ©emF2GURI 7

Total Receipts 1867-78, ,
Sand .ted interest account,.
seme:period • * * • • • • 15.
Deficit S 6,525,069
Deficit, including accrued
Interest due Government *ili*$$8t772
•Exclusive of accrued interest due Government.

liip.&v,8iaBMt^3tefl*^* Vol. I, Testimony of lay Gould*
Ihlrd.. Vol. VIII, Report of Accountant, p, 4878,

The hey fee the consolidation seems to have been, the
threat imposed by the announcement of the Burlington1s In
tention of extending lie line Into Denver*

This caused

Gould, according to Dexter, to meet the highest offer the
Boston Directors made, that of a stock for stock exchange.
This explanation may have been a rationalisation by the■
Boston Group* allowing teem a way out of a.difficult posi
tion.

Gould himself had made a threat earlier— that of

continuing the Kansas. Pacific from Denver on to fait lake
City or even the Pacific Coast., Threatened from bate sides
the Union Pacific Directors had no reel choice) their only
hope was to hold out far the bftst possible terras.. The
Bodga-Humphreys letter served is tee Instrument of proof'

of goad terms* Obviously the letter served the interests
of 'Gould more than tease of the Union Pacific directora,
but it did indicate teat the Union Pacific was not being
Injured by tee move.
By entangling the various Union Pacific Directors in
hie financial manipulation surrounding tee Kansas Pacific,
Gould was insured of eventually winning the contest on his
own terms.

It would seem that Gould agreed to a steel:, for

stock exchange as if ha wire giving e bargain to the Union
Pacific, when in reality placing a value of equality upon,
the two roads was over-estimating tee Kansas Pacific by
fifty per cent.

Regardless of book value of tee respective

roads* regardless of expressions of public opinion against

it and its effects upon the- people served by the roads,'the
consolidation took place, for hatter-or worse.

rotAJVfni
.

*

i

CQNCiUSION .

The web spun around the consolidation makes it diffi
cult to determine whether it wee the work of Gould aIons or
whether he wet drawn, as he hod claimed, into it by pressures
too great to resist.

Several questions present themselves

for answer*1*

Who profited from tee consolidation and to teat

2.

teat was tee long range effect upon tee new

extent?

road as a result of tee consolidation?
3,

Vie tee consolidation necessarily 'tee only method

by which tee two roads could have been Joined?

Ware there

any alternatives?
Obviously consolidation was net the only alternative
open to Gould end the directors of tee two roads. The Union
Pacific could have leased the Kansas Pacific -and its subsid
iaries.

This'offered an opportunity* -provided equitable

terms could have been worked out* for' -both roads* The Kan
sas Pacific complex would have enjoyed a profit with no
operational expense and the Union Pacific an opportunity
to have increased business through an enlarged trade sree
without tee immediate competition of the other road*

for

somo strange reason a lease was not considered because the

two Pacific roads were thought to bo “one* and could not

I '

'

•

“make or accept a lease to itself," This argument reveals
its spuriousness when the question is aekeds
was a consolidation necessary?

Why, then,

The strongest argument <

against leasing, and possibly the reason It was not implemented, was ltd irapermenance,
Another alternative owe co-operation,- The boards of
directors of both roads shared the services of several men
and the officers of the- roads were the same* with an excep

A pool agreement* such as

tion of the post ©f Secretary*

Gould proposed in 101® whereby the -securities could have ’■
been reduced to a first mortgage over.the entire-.road* a
government lien over part of it, and $4,800,000 capital
stock* was a likely choice*

The only problem to such a move

would have been a. determination as. to how each security,
holder-would be repaid In reduced securities,

The net ef

fect would have been to create a financially stronger read
than was eventually secured*

There is eo record of such

an alternative being, discussed by Gould and the dual-beard
officers*

hew the interests of these men could have bean

dissimilar as they switched their hats as .directors and'
officers seems hard to explain.

One can only conclude';that

while consolidation was not the most satisfactory altexnai;
1yac.Rv.Comm.Reoorf. Vol.I* Testimony of Axtetae# H*
"Holmes, pp. 272-3.
"t

tive it was the arrangement that was desired,

the proposed

construction by the Burlington into Benver was certainly a
.factor*

Consolidation with the Union Pacific eliminated

all possibility of the Kansas Pacific and Benver Pacific
being included in the Burlington System.

Proa Gould's point

of1view* as the prime 'Kansas Pacific holder# the proposed
Burlington plan meant— if completed before a consolidation
was welded— the destruction of his control over the beet
routes into Benver.
To Gould*a credit on# .factor should he brought to
light.

The railroads in the area west of the Missouri

River presented a challenge to him.

He envisioned the Mis

souri as the hub of a great railway system, with the western
roads bringing.business to paints along the river between
Omaha and Kansas City and delivering it to the roods running
east, "Just as the roads west of Chicago ...[delivered! to
the reads that ...[ran] east from Chicago.'*2 This explained
Why Gould and his. associates wire s.e active in acquiring
A?

Western railroads in the period under study.

The charter of

the Union Pacific forbade the extension of branch- 'lines into
territory that was considered normally tributary to. it, -but
the charter did not prohibit the acquisition of subsidiary
companies.
,t",—voiin;j iini ^Mrt/nT:,:,

This the Union Pacific under Gould had done, 'with
-

Ibid.. Vol. 1* Testimony of Charles F. Adame,# p.5b.

106
'3
abandon.
Gould*a reason for acting in this manner was simple:
he felt that Union Pacific should here been granted exclu
sive railroad rights west of the Missouri River by Its
charter*

Consequently, he used legalistic means to circum

vent it.

His "plan was that the Union Pacific should go

•head and occupy" the whole country west of the river* and
bring the business 'to the reads east** without being 'hemp*
ered by petty rules or regulations.

He summed up.his posl*

tion as follows i
My motive was thiss X thought that the Union
Pacific should occupy the territory■tributary to it-and
throw out feeders that would bring the business into
the main line*, and keep pace with the development of
the-great West, occupying-the country os feet os, or a
little faster than* the population -went in to sustain
it.©
*
^
In analysing the Gould "plan of development*' for East
ern rsilroads, it would seem the Idee was both good end bed*
, It would have been good in that it would hsve greatly simpli
fied the West's transportation problems both to end from the
lest*

it would have been bed in that it was. monopolistic,

plus the feet that Gould roads hid a reputation of giving. ■
4

notoriously bad service,

.

the feet that he practically sue*

Ibid.. p. 45.
Ibjd.T Vei, I* Testimony of Jay Gould* p. ST?*

Grodinsfcy, oo. .ell*., p, 599.

seeded in implementing his *plen” shows the perserverenc©
with which he pursued M e objectives

The uniting of the

■Union Pacific, Kansas facifi© and the Denver Pacific lute
one road, the Union Pacific Railway Company, was possible

only because the fSwMfte* did allow -that much— the union, of
the Pacific roads— -but, the feet that the*# wete other roads
west ef'-the Missouri to flee the Gould system stiff compe
tition saved the West from suffering the rigors of an out
right monopoly.

The question of who profited'and how much is one of
those problems that can be answered only through the use of
records the participants wanted to. reveal* .The m m around
Gould, of course, had e proportion in eech of the transac
tions ■leading up te the consolidation.

have been, considerable turning

No doubt there must

frnm the conference

table,

to count the shares of various stocks and the possible prof
it’. accrual, as various consolidation terms were discussed.

Moat of .'the- stocks the ©the* Union Pacific directors
7
possessed was acquired upon the aivi©« of Gould.

Frederick.

L. Ames, next to Gould, had the largest holding of Union
Pacific stock {par value, $3,861*200) and $969,QO0(par

8
value) Union Pacific bonds, mostly sinking fund issue*'
Pac.Ry,€oam .Reoort. Vol. 11* Testimony ofElisha Atkins
v.:,a
ibid.. Vol., 11* Testimony of i»ti«*ick ■$,.* *»»©,. p * «§87*-

pt, 759*. "

.

This gave him a total pax value holding in the Union Pacific
of $4,830,000.

Asms* holdings in the Kansas Pacific were

net quite as heavy.

He held $179,600 par value stock, .

$635,000 par value consolidated moxtgage bonds, and $14,000
per value Kansas Pacific {Denver Extension) bonds, for a
t o t a l par v a lu e of $ 82 8 ,6 0 0 .

9

Ames a ls o held some $100,000

par v a lu e firs t*m o rtg a g e bonds of the S t. Joseph and west\ ‘f

.v

-'

-

ern Railroad, alongwith 475 shares of its stock {par value,
■1©
$47,500),
At the time of the consolidation all these
stocks and bends were exchanged fat Union.Pacific securities
at par*

which meant that teas received' a total'-of $5,806,100

in various securities of the new road,

taking for fronted

that M s original .Union Pacific securities .had real-value

w a u M , « ih... hi. px.fl, » ,!» «..«. Wclfl. « < «.
Joseph and Western securities approximated $180,000 on paper,
Elisha Atkins possessed a total par value Union Peel*

fie securities holding of $806*700,.divided' between 2,937
shares of stock {par value $293,700) and $513,000 pa* value
bends (lend grant end sinking fund), 'His Kansas PacSic se
curities consisted of 1,810 shares of stock {par value*

li'Ibid1’
.
Ibid.* p. 686,
Ibid.. Vol. iS*. Testimony of Slleha Atkins, p. 754,

u

$90,500) and $28,570 pax value consolidated mortgage find
13
Denver Extension bonds. Atkins held $30,000 par value

tow. rf Vtoim. 1..W 0* tho St. J..«h M S *>.*»<>
with 142 shares of stock (pas value, $14,200),

When consoli

dation terms were completed Atkina received a total of $969,970
par value Union Pacific Railway securities.

Using th® earn©

formula as before, this meant a paper profit of §115,336 to

hU. »«1», hi. w n B M i

»»««> .wt »f , U tot tto o«9lnal Union Pacific securities,
\
t» Gordon Dexter, in January, 168®, held only stock

in the'Uhlan Pacific consisting of 6,376 shares (per value,
$637,600).

his Kansas Pacific holdings consisted of

$131,570 par value bonds of various classes and 896 shares
of stock (par value, $44,900),

Hi* holdings in the St,Jo

seph and Western duplicated that of Atkins, 330,000 par..
value bonds of two classes and 142 shares of -stock (per
18
value, $14,200).
Dexter came out .of-the consolidation
with securities of the new road valued at a par $858,270*
Again- using the formula, as above, this gave him a .paper:
1§.
.
ibid.
14 "
Ibid., p. 756,
15
ibid..p p . 754 and 756, Atkina reported that his total
expense for the Kansas Pacific -and St* Joseph and -Weetern se
curities amounted to $47,934* ,
,
16
Ibid.. Vol.II, Testimony of F*Gordon Dexter, p*?00*

Xf Ibid., p. 761*'
18 Ibid,, p« 702*

profit of $152,630, using Dexter’s own securities cost ■
figures.

It

The list of -the Boston Oisectors, i m whom date was
available, is Bare H. Balter.

Baker controlled 3,30? chares

Of Union Pacific stock going into the Consolidation (par
value, $330,700i*

His holdings in the Kansas Pacific ••

amounted to a total of $17,000 par value-’bands of1two is- '
sues,' $175 in unpaid interest coupons, and 548 shores of

steak (pa* value, $27,400).

Baker’s interest in the -St,

Joseph and Western consisted of $30,000 par value bonds and
95 shares of stack (pat value, $9,500).

His share in the-

consolidation that January totaled $404,775 in securities
of the. new road.

This gave him paper. >rofits of $51,

using his own securities cost figures.

IB

When Gould began purchasing his interest in the Kan#. sas Pacific, the read was in a bad’financial condition, but.
he sild "it was an immensely valuable"' property* intrinsically
24
Whether thia was what he really believed or whether

IlsM* . pp. 701 and 702* Dexter listed his total casts,
excluding original w i d e Pacific stock, as $67,900,
**
' Ibid.. Vol. II, Testimony of Etr* H. .Bake*,, p, 738.
gt
i Mdt

3S
"Aftt** p. 719*
23
Ibid.. -pp, 738 and 739*

24.

Ibid. Vol. 1, p. 464*

a

All
he saw $■ badly managed road In trouble with deflated securl
ties, that could be acquired at low prices, is difficult to
determine.

Regardless of the motivating force Gould began

the acquisition, that culminated in the consolidation of
1880, and reporting later his Kansas Pacific holdings cost
him $3,058,024*99 'A conservative estimate (see Figure 8,
p. 112), .put Gould*s profit in the consolidation at ^
$866,766.76, net taking Ante consideration any- profit made
eh his Kansas Pacific securities.,:
Other estimates,- which included profits on Kansas
fself16 securities, varied from a h i g h o f forty million
" 26 •
dollar* to a low of tan million dollars, 'the forty million
dollar figure is Out Of lint In light of the foot that the

sum total of stock# and bonds on the Kansas Pacific and
Denver Pacific was $49,551,768,50 ft the time of consolida
tion. -Gould In a marvelous under#tstment said’he "...did

m

not lee# any money**

The Villard estimate of tin million

dollars seems to be a more reasonable guess asto Gould**
’
total profit*.

#■*■

P*

Fortunes, p.482 end
27 ' - ■
Pac.Ry.Comm.Beoort. Vol. I. p. ■558.
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114'
What affect <114 the consolidation have oh the Union '*
Pacific?

the law. years prior to the consolidation found the

railroad in a very favorable financial condition.

Between

July 1, 1875, and January 1, 1880, the Union Pacific Railroad
paid eighteen dividends varying from one and one-half to two
per cent totaling $11,942,125*

After the consolidation, be-

twean April 1*. 1880 and April 1* 1884* the new road paid

dividends varying from one and one-half to one end three-quar
ters .per cent totaling $16,708,645,13 upon m much larger capitaliration.

By 1884, the' new road was unable to continue

dividend payment#. Additional competition earn from the
completion of the Northern Pacific to Seattle making a third
tranceontinenta1 line* there

me

also a general business de

pression which adversely affected the earnings of all rail*'
roads,

A decrease in income led to an increase in the float-- ■

lag debt on the road from $3,482,315,74 to $6,900,177.95 in
the four-year period between 1880-1884, .A psychological blow
was the sudden realisation that the rash of branch linos
built et great expense just prior to the consolidation were of

-fliJI-

"no considerable Value,*" Finally, the -threat Of Congressional

action to enforce payment of the Government lien in 1883,

Ibid.. Vol.Vlll,Report of Accountant, William Calhoun
nr*
‘

X2»
caused the Union Pacific id pay $700*000 on the debt rather
3.3
than declare ah annual dividend the next year. Further
attempts to retire .the Government lien became too much fox
the road to handle,

within a decade it was bankrupt and in

the hands of a receiver.
Regardless of the destructive effect of the consolida
tion over the short range* It* long range effect we* benefi
cial. •Following a period of adjustment end reorganisation,

the road emerged an excellent example of a well-run end well*
operated road,

lied it net. been for the mileage acquired by

the consolidation of 1880* this favorable condition might
net have existed.

•

.Any reel evaluation of the consolidation must Include
an evaluation of lay Gould,

for ell practical purposes the

man wee -the Union end Kansas Pacific roads.

'He needed only

an association 'With industry to become a tfuly representa
tive entity of the "Gilded Age,a' H# grew up with the eta*

matured with it*-' and passed from the scene with the period,
M« .made contributions end wreaked his damage.

Mi* contribu

tions were few but lasting.# The Gould lines ate given credit
for the innovation of interline freight# shipping freight"in

the seme car over several feeds* thus affecting substantial
i

. ,

i

savings to the reads end shippers in. both.time end cost.

!♦ r p . b *

33
frank H, Spearman,
York* Charles Scribner’s

This contrasted with the previous custom of each toad trans
ferring freight to its own ears when the freight came onto
its line.

Another contribution by Gould was the permanent

lowering of freight rates in the west end southwest. the
original purpose may net hive been to benefit the Western :
customer but this was the end result, because sates once
34 '
lowered'were e l m to increase.
■ The rugged individualism of Jfaf Gould was no better or .

no worse than any of the "Robber Barons." He m a one of the

moat hated financiers both in and out of Wall Street.

The

Grangers looked upon him as the "Railroad Promoter, incarnate."
35
and held 'hie in greet distrust. It was men like Gould who'
caused Western disillusionment m m railroads; the West had

earlier looked upon railroads
aic ills."

.as a panacea for ill econo-

36

An individual caught up in the tenor of the times
cannot be Judged by any ether than the standards of his own
times,

J«y Gould was a result of his times and representative

of it.

ThoSe he destroyed wore ploying the same game— just

Grodiosky, o p . cit.. pp,S54-57Q»
35
Moody, QP.eit.. pp. 214-15,
36
. . .
Robert s, Relgel, "Missouri Pacific Railroad to 1879,"
tijspeurj Historical Review. Vol. 18, 11924), p, S.

not quite so well.

Me was a devoted and loving lathes?*

His

leisure moments were spent i® horticulture and conversation
with John Burroughs, the famous Nineteenth Century naturalist.
This would net indicate an individual devoid of morals.

How

titan can his, and other of the "Robber Barons*,” actions be
explained? "
lack of 'liberal education wouldseera to be an answer.
Gould, along with the teat, bad little in the way of formal edu
cation— *the type:’of education that builds 'a social awareness
el the individual**., duty to society.

Gould came onto the

scene in a society that had exploded' industrially, railroad

m
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restrained Individualism in the transportation end of the •
business community*. Because the railroads were big end'!
strong end their abuses apparent .end felt at the. local level
it was only nature! that 'the Grangers end others would de
mand that regulation strike the railroads first.

Corporate

organisation had developed farther, faster, and ear# effi
ciently than had government and the teat of society,

This

was obvious by the fast that public opinion had little m no
effect upon Gould and 'bis.group while they developed the
consolidation plans,

while the very .'long range effect for

the Union Pacific was the strong toad of today# the short
range pillaging’by Gould left its mark.

This was why it

eventually became necessary for the public interest to be
inserted Info the corporate comaunityj an attempt, as it
were to keep the corporate fail from wagging the social body
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LETTEH FROM OffiBWJUB «. DODGE AND SOiGN
HUMPHREYS to UN*®*! PACIFIC DIRECTORS1 '.

ttesers, -Jay Gould, Russel Saga, F. Gordon Dexter.
■• ■ - •’ ■ iiishe Atkins, .f*ed, f* Ames, % II#' SalipjB,
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Gentlemen*
We acknowledge receipt ®$ the following letter, signed
by you and dated New York, Oct, 23, 1879.
"Gen. G. M. Dodge, end
Solon Humphries [sic*] ‘Sag*
Gentlemens
The undersigned, Directors in the Union Pacific .and
in the Senses Pacific Rail Read Companies, eonci#ving[6ic.]
that a consolidation of■the*# companies, upon equitable
conditions will promote the interests of each, as well
a* these wf the public and knowing yea* familiarity with
the problem* which each « step involves* and having con
fidence .la y e w judgment we unite in requesting you to
thoroughly consider, and with all convenient speed, xa. port upon the basis and terms of a fair just and equit
able consolidation of the two companies,®
In compliance with the request wherein, we have con
sidered the question of th# consolidation of the Union Peelfie,
'the Kansas Pacific end the' Denver Pacific Rail Roads, end
respectfttiiy submit #«* conclusion.
It is manifest from the Act of Congress of 1862, end
the move enlarged provisions in the Act of 1864, for consoli
dation, as mti ss by the provisions of subsequent legisla
tion, requiring the Pacific Roads unde* heevy penalties to
be operated throughout their whole extent as one continuous ,
line that Congroea contemplated such consolldationa® probable
end it is equally manifest from past experience, that this
requirement '&m he much better carried m % where the roads
are under'one management then where they axe under two.

1"Letterbook. November 30* 1878 to April 1* 1880,*
Haftai Isesia* v«i* 386*.

In considering the question of consolidation we first
sought the views of the.operating department of each reed as
to the comparative condition of the-, two roads and the probable
results of such consolidation.
We next considered the comparative value of the taw
properties their earning capacity and .the effect upon the
country they now accommodate, and their future natural ex
tensions, end-finally the economy of such consolidation, and
its policy.
.
without entering Into detail# we will state, briefly
the result# that control our recommendation*
First. 'The operating departments of the two roads consider a
consolidatlsn as very deslreable, so. far as they are con
cerned, They, hold that it will largely decrease■their ex
penses, and increase their gross and net earnings, and harmo
nise conflicting interests} that they can better accomodate
the traffic that pertains to each and obtain better, net re
sults therefrom. '
■
Second. The present condition of the -two roads, their road
beds, structures, equipment .shops, terminal facilities nay
be considered to be first-class, and ample for the business
they now transact.. Their earning capacity ia being steadily
increased to meet future demands'and the. earnings of both
roads for the year 1379 show very satisfactory results*
Third, The country that each seels.s., in the future to de
velop is naturally tributary to bath and a strong* prosper
ous end healthy Railway would be much .more likely to afford
adequate railway facilities than would be the case with two
warring and rival companies.
Especially Is this the case in the large and growing
state- of Colorado and In the’Territory' of Wyoming, Again,
on# corporation, of the wealth and receiving the earning#
of these two roads, used, under one direction could develop
new territory and advance capital to build new lines -that, at
first the country would not justify.
Fourth* Both roads reach*: and compete for business
same eastern and western commercial centers, While
cal interests are widely separated, hence under one
these conflicting interests-' -would be hormafilxed and
nomically administered*

from* the
their lo
management
sore eco

-fifth* The Union Pacific end Kansas Pacific Railroads (iaeluding the Denver Pacific end ell theif other branches}
have today a mileage of'about 3746 miles* Necessarially[sie.]
conflicting as 'they grow nearer to each other or as they'-'
contend for the same 'territory* Today it is ail paying prop
erty* and it is the duty of the owners* if passible to har
monise their interests and protect their future*
These considerations together with the fact that the
physical conditions of the road are about the seme* their
earning capacity being about equal■as compared with their
indebtedness and with the strong connection of those who
opperete [sic*] the two- properties and the benificial [ sic.]
results t# be obtained from operating them as one, we have concluded 'to recommend to- you that they should be conaoli- dated-In accordance with their Charters upon the following
basis.
'the new company fa be known ss the Union Pacific Rail
way ®a* That i*» the Union Pacific Rail Read, with a stock
capital of *36,762,300. and the Kansas Pacific Rail Road in*
eluding the Denver Pacific Railway with stock capital as
follows*
Kansas Pacific
Denver Pacific
Making a- total of

$1 0 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0

shall .be consolidated"into the. Vhleft,Pacific Railway with a
stock.capital of $S1,762,300 “and the stock of the Union-Pa
cific- Railway* after consolidation,, to-be issued for the
stock of the Union Pacific, the Kansas Pacific and Denver ~
.Pacific Rail Reids, share for share*'
The Union Pacific Railway would then represent a mileage
of actually construeted end operated .road of <3746 miles or less
then $14,000 of stock, per mile, controlling end developing *
Territory, now in its infancy, the growing business of which,
end its rapid development has astonished everyone.
-its future business no one can. now safely predict but is
beyond question that such a consolidation and such a corpora
tion would control as rainy, if- not more, miles..of paying road
then any other in the world, end would have # strength, charac
ter end -ability tme' future growth and development, unprecedented
Trusting that our consideration of 'this-.subject and our
conclusion therein rasy meet yea* approval*
•» are. Gentlemen
Very Respectfully Tours,

G. M, fodg#
Solon Humphreys

Note footing error
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B. ARTICLES GF UNION AND CGNSOtlOATlQN

BETSJEEM the Union Pacific Railroad Company, the Kansas Pacific
Railway Company, and the Denver Pacific Railway and Telegraph
Company, ■
•■. 1
.... :
FORMING THE UNION PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY,'
WHEREAS, The’Union Pacific Railroad Company, a corporation
duly organised and existing under the Act of.Congress of .
July 1st,; 1862, entitled: "Aft Act of aid in the construction
of «irailroad and telegraph line from the Missouri Elver to
the Pacific Ocean, and to secure to the Government the use of the same for Postal, Military, and other purposes." and. the
Act of Congress:of July 2d, 1864, and various'- other' afeth*
amendatory of the foregoing, owns & line of railroad and tele*
graph, -extending -from- the Missouri River -to' Ogden In the
Territory of Utah, a 'distance of 1,042 miles; and,
55HEREAS, the Kansas Pacific-Railway Company, described in,
.the said Act of Congress of July 1st, 1862, as the Leavenworth,
Pawnee t Western Railroad Company, the name whereof was’after*
wards changed to 'that of thesunion Pacific-Railroad Company,
Eastern Division, and again subsequently changed .to'the'Kansas
Pacific Railway Company, i« « corporation which is antitied ,
to participate in--the benefits of" the1said Act of'Congress of
July. 1st, 1862, pud of July 2d, 1864, -and the various acta
amendatory thereof and relating thereto; arid,' '
WHEREAS, The paid Kansas pacific .Railway Company owns and
operates as a branch of the Union Pacific Railroad a railroad
and telegraph line* from a point eennecttngwlth the Missouri
Pacific Railroad, in Kansas City, in Missouri, thence from
the Missouri River,'at the mouth of theKansea River, on the
south side thereof, with a spur from .Wyandotte in the State
of Kansas, being from'the'Seat State line'of Kansas.’to Denver,
639 miles in length, with a branch from « point on the sain
line- near Lawrence, to Leavenworth, 34 miles in langth, in
said State of Kansas, connecting at Denver with the Denver
Pacific Railway, and is entitled to extend said-’railroad to
the western boundary of the former Territory of Kansas, to
locate and construct breaches'-of said‘railroad i n ‘the'Counties
of the former Territory of Kansas, adjacent to the line of
said railroad* as then located and defined by-‘law;' and, '
fcSBEREAS, The 'Denver Pacific Railway -and Telegraph Company, .
under and by virtue of the said Acts o f ‘Congress, 'and'of an
Act of'Congress-approved March 3d# 1869, entitled'! **An Act to
euthoriae the transfer of -lends.granted'to the Union Pacific
Railway Company,, Eastern Division,1between- Denver end the ;
point of connection with 'the Union Pacific Railroad, to 'the.

John F* Dillon, Pacific Railroad Lews.. E. C. Miles',
N, Y,, 1890, pp. 200-209.

Denver Pacific Railway end Telegraph Company,-'end to expe- '
dite the completion of railroads -to Denver -Is -the Territory
of Colorado!,! end ef an Act 'of Congress approved' June 2 0 th,
1874, which,'among other things, enacts that for oil- the
purposes of the said Act of July 1st, 1862, end of the acta
amendatory thereof!
' “The Denver Pacific Railway end Telegraph Company shall
he deemed end taken 'to be a pert end extension of the toed of
the Kansas Pacific Railroad to the point of junction thereof
with the toed of the Union Pacific Railroad Company at Chey
enne, as'provided In the Act ef March $d, 1869," whereby, end
fay. force whereof, 'the said Denver Pacific Railway and Tele*
graph Company'la ’likewise entitled to participate' In the bene
fits of the aforementioned Acta of Congress of July 1st,1862,
and July 2d, 1864, and the-various acts .-amendatory thereof
and supplemental thereto, and relating to the Pacific system
of railroads, all of which, whether, particularly herein des
cribed o* not,, are, for greater certainty in -this behalf, ■
referred to and made part hereof! and,

SHEREAS, In the aforesaid legislation of Congress, appli
cable to the above-mentioned three railroad companies, it la
provided that they may unite and consolidate their respective
organizations! and,
WHEREAS, Each of the said above-mentioned three companies,
by corporate action duly and severally had, have resolved,
pursuant te the authority in that behalf vested in them fey
law, to unite end consolidate their respective organisations
into one company , end have severally agreed to end with each
ether upon the terms of such union and consolidation, feeing
the terms herein embodied and expressed!

-,
Ml.ftD.-and cpasglldatApg.. made this,
the twenty-fourth day of January, A*D. 1880, between the said
Union Pacific Railroad Company, party of the first part, the
said -Kansas Pacific Railway Company, -party of the second part,
and the said Denver Pacific Railway'and Telegraph Company,
party, of the third .part,
.
>

WITNESSETH, That th# said parties have respectively agreed,
and do hereby severally agree' to -end with each other, upon
the following Articles of Union and Consolidation of their
respective organisations into one company, via.;—
Article 1, The said Union Pacific -Railroad Company, the
said Kansas Pacific Railway Company, and tho said Denver
Pacific Railway and Telegraph Company, in consideration of
the premises, do hereby severally agree to and with each other
to unite and consolidate, and do hereby unite, form and consoli
date their respective organisations, properties-, -and companies
into one consolidated- company, which, shall succeed to, possess,
sndtbe entitled' to receive fro® the Government cf the United
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States all and singular the grants, benefits, immunities,
guarantees, sets and things to be etene and performed, and ba
subject to the same team®, conditions, restrictions, and re
quirement* which the aforesaid three companies respectively,
at the date' of this consolidation, are, or may be, entitled
or .subject to under- the. Acts of Congress in that behalf* in
place and substitution of' said constituent companies,: so
consolidated,.respectively; and the said consolidated' company
assumes to and for itself ell of the -provisions of said .Acts
of Congress, m far asappllcablfe.relatine or in any -manner
appertaining to said constituent companies or either of them,
including the power to sue and be sued in all courts whether
federal or State, and the right of corporations organized
under a law of -'the- United states to remove causes .from #teie,
te Federal courts; and all'of the previsions of .the afore* '
mentioned. Acta of Congress,.and each .of them, so far as in
their nature applicable .to'the company 'hereby formed, shall
apply thereto* it being the intent of the parties hereto and
of these Articles of Union and Consolidation to organize the
company hereby formed under the said. Acta of Congress, and to
make the Sets of this company as fully- as If the same were
incorporated herein at large.
Art.11. The-name of the consolidated company hereby formed
shall be t m UNION PACIFIC RAILWAY CC»ANY,
Art,III, The capital stock of the- said Union Pacific hell*
way Company shall be fifty millions,seven hundred,and sixty
two thousand three hundred dollars {$50,762,300} {being the
total aggregate amount of the outstanding stock, of the three
constituent companies), which shall be divided Into shares
of one hundred dollars each, end it shell be issued in lieu,
of the stock of the said constituent companies on -the surren
der thereof, for that purpose, by the, respective holders
thereof.
;
Ivory stockholder in the Oenver Pacific Railway end Tele
graph Company end in the Union. Pacific Railroad Company shall
receive* in. piece of every share, of on# hundred dollars sur
rendered, « share.of one 'hundred dollars in the new company,
and every stockholder in the Kansas Pacific Railway Company,
the shares in which are only fifty dollars C$50) each, shall
resolve,- in place of every-two share* of the stock at the
time held by such stockholder in such company* a share'of the
capital stock of the new corporation, upon surrendering to the
new corporation the certificates of stock -held' by -such stock
holder ,
' Art.1V. The.- said new corporation shall*, without unnecessary
delay. Issue certificates of stock*, in such form as may by the
beard of directors be deemed advisable, and such beard' shall
provide and adept such rule* and regulations #• may.be nece
ssary and proper-for the issuing and transfer of shares of '
stock of the said new corporation*
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Art. V. The directors of the said Union Pacific Railway
Company, to be elected % the stockholders at the annual l
meetings herein provided for, shell he fifteen in number,*
each at whom m e t he the hone.fide owner of at least fifty
shares of stock in the consolidated company, .inch direc
tors shall be chosen annually by # majority #f the votes of
'the stockholders voting in person or by proxy at such elec
tion. And they shall continue to be directors until others
axe elected and qualified in their places, lie person shall
be a director unless he shell be qualified to vote for dir
ectors st the election'®t which he shall be chosen* and va
cancies in the board of directors ray be filled by the remain
ing directors at. any regular meeting of the board.
The directors of said company shall, annually, as aeon as
may be after their election, elect free their own number a
president end vice-president, and shell else.elect a trea
surer and secretary.
Art. Vl. The following-named persona .shall be the. first
directors of said corporation, vir*«
L. tees.
Solon Humphreys
H. hake*
David Dows
Elisha Atkins
William 1, Scott
f* Gordon Dexter
. Sites H* H..Clark
Sidney Dillon
■ Thomas T. Ickert
Russell Sage
John Sharp
ley Gould
. Grenville U. Dodge
::
Carlos Greeley
The followingnamed persons shall be the first, officers ef
the said corporation via.*. ■
President, Sidney Dillon.
■
Vice-President, Elisha Atkins. .
•■ ■■Treasurer and secretary# Henry McFarland.
The said directors and officers shall continue in office
until their successors ere chosen* as provided in thee® Art* VII, 'Until otherwise duly provided, theannuel meet- •
ings of the Stockholders of the Union Pacific Railway Company
•hall be held at the company's offlee* in the City of Mew York, on the first Wednesday following the fourth day of
March in each year*, between the hours of 10 o'clock A. m,
end 4 o'clock P. M. of
iMW Wjj

'In addition five Government directors, were.'to ba_appoint<
ed fey the fresiden* of the United States by de6?*fen of Uforney General, Charles sevens,, march 8, 1880, see footnote
p. 204 of Sillon, BisMifiS- %>■ &MB.*

Notice.of such meeting shell he given as may be prescribed
by the by-lews.
- These provisions may be changed by ’the stockholders of the
consolidated company at any annual meeting of the
stock
holders.
Art. viii. fh.e parties hereto of the' first end second endthird parts hereby assign, transfer* set over* and convey,
unto,the said Union Pacific Railway Company, the consolidated
corporation hereby formed, all the rights* privileges*, exemp
tions* and franchisee of etch of said companies* parties
hereto* end ell the property* real* personal, and mixed,.andall theses in action, debts, on whatever account, of*, owing* or
belonging to either of said companies* and all claims* demands*
property, rights of -way* leases* leasehold Interests* branches*
iron rails* rolling stock* tools and implements, -'and property
of every description* name*' and nature:* belonging to either
of the sold companies, with.the appurtenances, to be 'held*'
earned, and.controlled by the said consolidated corporation*
its suceesaorS-and assigns, as fully and completely* to ail
intents and purposes, .at the respective parties thereto do
or can now own, hold* use, enjoy* or control the same; and
the -parties hereto agree to execute and deliver to said con
solidated corporation instruments of transfer or assignments,
or other instruments proper or necessary to carry out the
covenants, conditions, and provisions of this agreement.
This assignment, transfer, sale, and conveyance is made to
-the said.consolidated corporation subject to ill liens,charges*
and equities pertaining thereto,
, ■
Art. IX. Nothing in this agreement contained -shall affect .
or .prejudice any rights otherwise existing of the consolidated
company to make ..such further increase, of stock or bonds as
said consolidated company may by law fee entitled to make* or
restrict the amount Of stock or bends which such consolidated
company is by law authorised to issue or make,
wor shall anything herein contained affect or impair'the
right to -issue all.unissued bonds under the .Kansas Pacific
Consolidated Mortgage of date May 1st*' 1879, wherein lay Gould
end Russell Rage are Trustees! but such unissued bonds may* - notwithstanding 'this consolidation* be issued in the same
manner end with the cam# effect in. all respects as if tke.seer tide* .had- not been adopted and' executed,
.
And it is expressly agreed:' that the stockholders of the consolidated company shall have all the powers which would
have been possessed by the stockholders of -each constituent
company if this consolidation had not been effected* to ratify*
approve* end carry out any .contracts made by -either eonstitu- '
ent company, end requiring the ratification ox approval'of its
stockholders.
/.

131
The power of the Union Pacific Railroad Company to issue
ell unissued bonds .under the mortgage of July let. 1879,
wherein the Union Trust Company is Trustee, is fully end
completely reserved*
-'Art* X. The new company hereby formed does not herein
aseumo eny separate or individual liability for the- outstand
ing debts, obligations, end liabilities of the respective
constituent companies, whose severel. tod separate existence
as to third, parties shall, as respects such debts,obligations,
end liabilities of every kind and nature, still-continue net*
withstanding these Article* of Union end Consolidation* But
nothing herein contained shell prevent any validdebt, obli
gation, or liability of either constituent company from being
enforced against the property of the proper constituent
company, which fey force of-these articled becomes the pro*
party of the consolidated company.
The corporate existence of the respective constituent
companies shall not absolutely cease eo instant! m the con*
summation of the union and consolidation norein provided for,
but shall remain end: continue so far as necessary to carry out
the intent end purpose thereof.
Art, XI, These Articles of Consolidation shell go into
effect, and- the consolidated company hereby formed shall come
into existence#: upon the day on which a copy hereof i* filed
in the Department -of the Inferior, as provided in the legis
lation of Congress in that behalf .3 Art, XII, The existing fey*Iaws of the Union Pacific Rail* •
road Company ere. hereby provisionally adopted, .and shall apply
to the company hereby formed, until duly changed or repealed.
.Art, VIII. All books, vouchers# records, instruments of
title* cash, evidence.of'debt* contracts and documents per*
.tainlng to the business or property of the said three companies,
parties hereto, shell, without delay, fee delivered to the pro
per -officer* of the consolidated company, and the said book*.,
records* and papers shell fee deemed and taken# as far as nece
ssary, as the' records end books* records, vouchers, and papers
shell fee subject to the peeper examination and inspection of
all parsons interested therein,
Art, XIV. These articles may be- emended end modified, from
time to time, end in such manner as the holders of two*thirds
of the stock of the consolidated company may direct or approve.
3
Took effect January 26, 1800 upon filing in Department
of Interior, Dillon, M m W S &• 1-fcSHS.. p. 208,-

m
Art. W't This agreement shell be executed on the part of
the respective parties hereto, by the proper officers, end
under'the corporate seals of said companies.
In Witness Whereof, -the said parties have caused their
respective corporate.seals to'be- hexe-unto affixed, and the
same to be attested by their- respective Presidents and Secre
taries, this the twenty-fourth day of January. 1880.
THE UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CC&PANY.
[Seal]
By Sidney billon,
' g2£SMm& >
Attest.
Henry KeFarland*
THE KAN6ASPACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY,
[Seal]
By Sidney Dillon,

SxmiisM

Attest,
•A, H. Calef,

THE DENVER PACIFIC RAILWAY & TELEGRAPH COMPANY,
[Seal]
By S. M. Edgerton,
Attest.
Seal.

■ D. H. Moffatt* Jr.,:

asMaa §mm$sxx»

■ The ••Union Pacific Railway-Company-has signified and hereby
signifies Its assent- to and acceptance- of the foregoing Arti
cles of Union and Consolidation, January 24, 1880.
THE Willi PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY,
By Sidney Dillon,

SSfilMiiS-.
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